民用航空器貿易之「AB大戰」，係指歐盟空中巴士公司（Airbus）與美國波音公司（Boeing）為了爭取訂單，聯合其母國政府，對民用航空器採購商之政府施加壓力，因而引發的貿易爭端，這也正是WTO民用航空器貿易協定（Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft ）制定之背景。
我國自二○○二年二月一日正式簽署上述協定，自應遵守該協定第4條禁止使用不合理壓力與誘因影響購機決定之規定。不料同年華航中程客機之採購，卻引發歐盟指控有違前述規定。事件最後在華航宣佈同時向波音、空中巴士購機後落幕，但也顯見AB大戰並未因民用航空器貿易協定之出爐而停息。
由於民用航空器產業目前最大者即為歐美之A、B兩大生產廠商，一旦一造在爭取訂單時，採取了違反民用航空器貿易協定第4條之手段，且得以因控方難以舉証其之違反而免於任何後果，則根據賽局理論，另一造必也會採取相仿之謀略。
根據上述的發現，華航未來的購機，難免會再度陷入腹背受脅、受誘的困境，不過由於舉證責任之困難，美、歐應不致對我國訴諸爭端解決，愈發突顯民用航空器貿易協定第4條規範功能之有限。

Airbus and Boeing have long been in trade conflict, also known as the “AB War”, under which both companies unite their respective governments to exert pressure on the governments of countries which procure civil aircraft, all for the purpose of securing contracts. It is also the background behind the adapt of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.
Taiwan became official signatory of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on Feb.1, 2002. As a signatory, Taiwan should obey the rules of Article 4 which forbids using unreasonable pressure and inducement to affect decisions on aircraft procurement. However, the procurement of aircraft by China Airlines at the same year was accused by the EU of violating the rule discussed above. The dispute ended finally after China Airlines announced that it would procure aircraft from both of these companies. It also reveals that this war has not been finished even with the existence of the agreement.
Airbus and Boeing are the biggest manufacturers in world’s civil aircraft industry. If one of them adopts measures violating Article 4 of the agreement, and is relieved from any consequences because the plaintiff cannot prove the disobedience, the rival side would undoubtedly, at the time, according to the game theory, the take the same strategy.
According to the discovery above, in the future the China Airlines will unavoidably fall into same dilemma of being threatened and induced by the manufacturers. However, It is believed that U.S and EU would not easily seek settlement of controversies considering the difficulty in producing proof. It also discloses that the function of Article 4 is obviously limited.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機
第二節 研究架構
第二章 民用航空器協定之背景介紹
第一節 產業特性簡介
第二節 一九七○年代國際民用航空器貿易情勢
第三節 部門別協定的發展
第四節 民用航空器談判
第一項 美國的立場
第二項 其他國家的立場
第五節 民用航空器協定的制定過程
第一項 美國的工作初稿
第二項 談判的過程
第三章 民用航空器協定之探討
第一節 民用航空器協定屬於複邊貿易協定
第二節 民用航空器協定之結構簡介
第三節 政府指定採購、強制分包及誘導之規定
第四節 民用航空器協定第四條之文義解釋
第四章 民用航空器協定第四條相關事件
第一節 以色列EL-AL航空公司購機案
第二節 二十一世紀美國航空投資與改革法
第三節 歐盟與俄羅斯合作發射聯合號火箭
第四節 美國空軍租借波音B767案
第五節 歐盟A 400 M軍用運輸機採購案
第六節 小結
第五章 華航購機案與第四條之關係
第一節 華航購機案始末
第二節 民用航空器協定第4條於本案之適用
第六章 再探民用航空器協定第四條之規定
第一節 民用航空器協定第四條規範效力不彰？
第二節 由Hotelling’s Lemma來看民用航空器貿易
第三節 我國未來購機案之處境
第七章 結論
附錄
參考資料：

中文部分
1.羅昌發，國際貿易法，世界貿易組織下之法律新秩序：國際貿易法研究（五），台北，元照，二○○○年九月初版第三刷。
2.國貿局文件，「民用航空器貿易協定」簡介，二○○三年八月十二日。

英文書籍
1. Leslie A. Glick, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: WORLD TRADE AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND (1984)
2. William E. O'Connor, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE ECONOMICS (1985)
3. Gilbert R. Winham, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION (1986)
4. James Ott, AIRLINE ODYSSEY (1995)
5. Matthew Lynn, BIRDS OF PREY: BOEING VS. AIRBUS: A BATTLE FOR THE SKIES (1996)
6. Steven McGuire, AIRBUS INDUSTRIE (1997)
7. Kenneth Button, FLYING INTO THE FUTURE:AIR TRANSPORT POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1998)
8. Philip Lawrence & Derek Braddon, STRATEGIC ISSUES IN EUROPEAN AEROSPACE (1999)
9. Ivan L. Pitt &John R. Norsworthy, ECONOMICS OF THE U.S. COMMERCAIL AIRLINE INDUSTRY.. PRODUCTIVITY, TECHNOLOGY AND DEREGULATION (1999)

英文文章
1. W. Stephen Piper, Unique sectoral agreement establishes free trade framework, Law and Policy in international Business, 1990. 221
2. Vicki L. Golich, Made in America? Sustaining a Competitive Presence in the Commercial Class Aircraft Industry in the 1990s, The International Executive, New York: Jul/Aug 1996. Vol. 38, Iss. 4; p. 465
3. John D. Morrocco, Boeing, EU Resolve Dispute Over Merger; Airbus restructuring to improve competitiveness looms larger as it squares off against new U.S. heavyweight, Aviation Week & Space Technology. New York: July 28, 1997. Vol. 147, Iss. 4; p. 22


WTO文件
1. TCA/M/9 (May 1, 2000)
2. TCA/M/10 (Aug. 1, 2000)
3. TCA/M/11 (Dec. 22, 2000)
4. TCA/M/13 (Jan.11, 2002)
5. TCA/M/14 (July 29, 2002)
6. TCA/M/15 (Mar. 27, 2003)
7. TCA/M/17 (Jan.30, 2004)