本文以美國市場為例，探討共同基金經理人的撤換和積極管理之間的關係。此研究利用積極比率做為衡量積極管理的因子，預期積極比率與經理人撤換存在負項關係。後續進一步挑選出高風險類型的基金，來了解在基金的投資目的為追求高風險高報酬的情況下，是否會使積極管理對經理人撤換產生更強烈的影響。實證結果表明，當經理人越積極的選股，且績效表現越好時，被撤換的機率越低；相反地，當積極選股的結果為績效變差時，其被撤換的機率則會提高。而在將基金區分為高風險基金與其他基金後，本文發現高風險基金的確會更在意經理人是否積極的管理，若高風險基金的經理人越不積極的管理基金，其被撤換的機率將比其他基金類型還要高。此外，本文也針對在撤換發生後，基金的績效表現是否會顯著成長。結果表明，新上任的經理人並不會為基金帶來更好的報酬，且積極比率也不會出現顯著的提升。

This study examines the relationship between fund manager turnover and active management in the context of the U.S. market. The research utilizes Active Share as a measure of active management and expects a negative association between Active Share and manager turnover. Furthermore, it investigates whether the impact of active management on manager turnover is more pronounced in high-risk funds, where the investment objective is to pursue high-risk, high-return outcomes. The empirical results reveal that as fund managers exhibit greater stock selection activity and achieve better performance, their likelihood of being replaced decreases. Conversely, when active stock selection leads to deteriorating performance, the probability of manager turnover increases. Additionally, when differentiating funds into high-risk funds and other funds, the study finds that high-risk funds are more sensitive to the level of manager activity. In high-risk funds, lower levels of manager activity correspond to higher probabilities of manager turnover compared to other fund types. Furthermore, the study examines post-replacement performance and finds no significant improvement in fund returns after a manager change. Active Share also does not exhibit a significant increase following a manager change.

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