心靈範圍在哪裡？以往我們討論心靈議題時，不外乎都是將心靈視為存在於體表之內的一種實體、一種器官或是一種功能，例如：靈魂、大腦、又或者是指包含大腦與所有在體表之內的神經系統。但是，Andy Clark與David Chalmers告訴我們在某些情況下，心靈是可以超越體表而存在的，心靈的界限不是我們的體表；這個立場被我們稱為「外在論」或是「展延心靈觀」。對照於Clark與Chalmers的立場，以往將體表視為心靈界限的立場就被統稱為「內在論」。
　　本篇論文以Clark與Chalmers於1998年發表的文章“The Extended Mind”為主，透過介紹展延心靈觀的發展背景聚焦於展延心靈觀的主要論點，並且根據Frederick Adams與Kenneth Aizawa對展延心靈觀的批評及Clark、Richard Menary等人所提出的回應讓我們對於展延心靈觀有更深入的討論與理解。最後，由Clark與Chalmers所提到的「社會性的展延心靈（socially extended mind）」回到語言與心靈的討論，透過Clark曾多次在文章與著作中提到俄國語言及心理學家Lev Semenovich Vygotsky的語言理論，試圖連結Clark與Chalmers的主動外在論與Putnam和Burge的傳統外在論，並且進一步地思考展延心靈觀發展性。

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