| 研究生: |
李怡慶 Lee, Yi-Ching |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
單一選區下兩黨負面攻擊與反擊之競選賽局 A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Negative Campaigning and Counter-attack in a Two-Party Electoral Competition in a Single Member District Election |
| 指導教授: | 王智賢 |
| 口試委員: | 翁堃嵐 |
| 學位類別: |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱: |
社會科學學院 - 財政學系 Department of Public Finance |
| 論文出版年: | 2026 |
| 畢業學年度: | 114 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 33 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 政黨攻擊 、政黨反擊 、子賽局完全均衡 、序列均衡 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Party attack, Party counter-attacks, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:15 下載:0 |
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長期以來,臺灣的政黨競爭主要呈現兩黨對立的格局,雖然藍綠兩黨仍為政治舞台的核心,但隨著選舉環境與選民結構的變化,兩黨之間的互動樣態已不再侷限於傳統的對抗形式。在競選過程中,政黨採取的負面攻擊與反擊策略,逐漸成為影響選票結果的重要因素,為了探討此一現象,本文建構一個賽局模型,以分析在單一選區下兩政黨發動負面攻擊與反擊的決策行為及其均衡結果。在兩黨同時決策的情境中,各政黨是否選擇攻擊或反擊,取決於該行為所能帶來的淨利益大小決定。此外,在資訊不對稱的情境下,本文推導出四組混合序列均衡,結果顯示無論政黨1在強勢型態(s)或弱勢型態(w)條件下,均會採取一致的策略選擇,其攻擊決策需考量此行為所能帶來的淨利益決定,而政黨2的反擊行為亦依其可預期之淨利益效果而定。本文的分析不僅揭示了政黨在面對攻擊與反擊決策時的基礎,也有助於理解臺灣選舉中負面競選的策略選擇與其背後的成立條件,為後續探討多黨競爭負面攻擊行為提供理論參考。
For a long time, party competition in Taiwan has primarily presented a two-party rivalry structure. Although the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Parties remain the core of the political stage, as the electoral environment and voter structure have changed, the interaction pattern between the two parties is no longer confined to the traditional confrontational form. During election campaigns, the negative attacks and counter-attacks adopted by political parties have increasingly become key factors influencing voting outcomes. To explore this phenomenon, this paper constructs a game theory model to analyze the decision-making behavior and equilibrium outcomes of the two parties regarding launching negative attacks and counter-attacks in a single-member district. In the scenario where both parties make simultaneous decisions, whether each party chooses to attack or counter-attack depends on the net benefit that the action can bring. Furthermore, under conditions of asymmetric information, this paper derives four sets of mixed sequential equilibria. The results show that Party 1 will adopt a consistent strategic choice regardless of whether the situation is a strong-type or weak-type condition. Its decision to attack must consider the net benefit that this action can bring, while the counterattack behavior of Party 2 is determined by its expected net benefit. The analysis presented in this study not only clarifies the foundations of how parties make decisions regarding attacks and counter-attacks, but also enhances our understanding of the strategic choices behind negative campaigning in Taiwanese elections and the conditions under which such strategies are viable. It further provides a theoretical reference for future research on negative campaigning behaviors in multiparty competition.
第一章 前言 1
第二章 兩黨同時選擇攻擊與反擊之競選賽局 8
第一節 第二階段子賽局分析 10
第二節 第一階段全賽局分析 12
第三章 資訊不對稱下政黨2遭到攻擊時,是否進行反擊之競選賽局 18
第一節 兩黨在資訊不對稱下的預期報酬 20
第二節 均衡分析 21
第四章 結論 29
參考文獻 31
I. 中文部分
周軒逸,2021,〈幽默、非幽默反駁之相對效果:候選人核心形象之干擾〉,《新聞學研究》149: 51–112
張傳賢,2012,〈政黨認同、負面資訊的競爭與選民投票抉擇:2010年五都選舉的實證研究〉,《選舉研究》19(2): 37–70
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II. 英文部分
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全文公開日期 2029/06/08