根據經濟部《2025年中小企業白皮書》，台灣中小企業家數佔全體企業98%以上，銷售額貢獻達全國總額51%（約新台幣31兆元），堪稱台灣經濟的「護國神山群」。然而，在亮眼數字背後，中小企業長期面臨正式金融體系的融資配給困境——資訊不對稱與擔保品不足，使具備實質競爭力的企業，往往因財務報表之表面指標欠佳而遭受授信限制。
本研究正視此一結構性問題，以兩家台灣中小企業為個案，深入探究商業銀行與租賃機構對中小企業授信之差異化邏輯。研究發現，商業銀行憑藉關係型借貸之軟資訊積累與交易自償性分析，能夠突破表面財務比率之限制，對高槓桿貿易商（負債比率近500%）給予大額貿易融資；租賃機構則以決策快速、對輕資產容忍度高之特性，填補銀行授信天花板之外的資金缺口，形成「雙軌融資」之互補生態。
本研究之核心主張在於：商業銀行與租賃機構並非對立的競爭關係，而是各有比較優勢的融資生態共同體。兩者在授信邏輯、風險胃納與產品設計上的差異，恰好構成中小企業在不同成長階段所需的差異化資金支持。唯有深刻理解此一雙軌體系的運作邏輯，金融機構方能真正與中小企業並肩成長，共同支撐台灣經濟這座「護國神山群」的長期根基。

According to the 2025 White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises, SMEs account for over 98% of all enterprises in Taiwan and contribute approximately 51% of national sales revenue — roughly NT$31 trillion — earning their designation as the "collective guardian mountains" of the Taiwanese economy. Yet behind these figures lies a persistent structural challenge: information asymmetry and collateral deficiencies subject many genuinely competitive SMEs to credit rationing, constraining their access to growth capital on the basis of superficially weak financial indicators.
This study investigates the differentiated credit logic employed by commercial banks and leasing institutions toward two Taiwanese SME cases — a high-leverage petrochemical trader carrying a debt ratio approaching 500%, and an asset-light K-POP startup with 871% annual revenue growth. The findings show that commercial banks leverage soft information and self-liquidating trade finance structures to transcend surface financial ratios, while leasing institutions fill residual financing gaps through faster decision-making and greater risk tolerance, giving rise to a complementary dual-track financing ecosystem.
The central thesis is that commercial banks and leasing institutions are not competitors but complementary pillars of an integrated SME financing ecology — each contributing differentiated capital support that SMEs require across different stages of growth. Understanding this dual-track dynamic is essential for financial institutions seeking to genuinely grow alongside Taiwan's SMEs.

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