臺灣自從 1970 年代經濟起飛後，造就了許多白手起家的企業。而在往後的世代，這些企業也持續以家族的模式進行所有權控制和治理。目前臺灣仍有大量企業是由家族成員藉由持股或是擔任高階經營者的角色掌握整個家族企業。然而在面臨產業轉型、二代接班、全球供應鏈重組等壓力下，併購成為許多企業快速取得資源或擴展規模的方式。但家族企業之併購決策可能同時受到代理問題、管家理論與社會情感財富等因素影響，因此本次研究期待透過實證研究了解家族企業對於其併購累積異常報酬的影響。
本研究針對2010年至2024年臺灣上市櫃公司的併購宣告事件為樣本，了解家族企業在進行併購時影響市場評價的關鍵要素為何。本研究實證結果發現，台灣家族企業在併購宣告期間呈現正向顯著的累積異常報酬，此結果與代理理論中主併方易因盲目擴張而做出較差決策的想法顯然不同，倒是契合管家理論中因家族企業對於企業本身長期經營的寄望將更審慎決策因此帶來正面評價的觀點。而進一步觀察不同支付方式對於累積異常報酬的影響，研究發現換股支付達到正向且顯著的反應，雖然此結果與多數西方文獻將換股視為負面訊號的觀點不同，但也印證了臺灣投資人對企業發行新股擴張多抱持較高期待的特徵。然而，在控制其他變數進行迴歸分析後，單一支付方式間目前暫看不出顯著優劣。最後在不同產業類別的比較上，也尚未觀察到各產業對於家族企業併購績效顯著的影響。
根據本次實證結果，可了解到市場對臺灣家族企業併購之評價並非只由單一因素決定，還有可能受到交易條件、治理特性與臺灣市場環境的影響。因此透過本次研究結果也建議未來投資人在評估未來重大併購資訊時，可回歸主併公司治理特性與實質整合能力，以建立更客觀的評估參考。

Since Taiwan’s economic takeoff in the 1970s, many self-made enterprises have developed into family-controlled firms. Facing industrial transformation and global supply-chain restructuring, these firms increasingly use mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to expand scale. However, their M&A decisions may be shaped by agency problems, stewardship motives, and socioemotional wealth concerns. This study therefore examines how family control affects cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around M&A announcements.
Using M&A announcements of Taiwanese listed and over-the-counter firms from 2010 to 2024, this study analyzes how governance, payment methods, and industry influence market reactions. The results show that family firms exhibit significantly positive CARs. This aligns with stewardship theory, suggesting that prudent long-term decisions generate positive evaluations. Furthermore, stock payments yield significantly positive reactions. While differing from Western literature, this confirms Taiwanese investors' high expectations for stock-financed expansions. However, regression analyses show no single payment method or industry category demonstrates significant superiority.
These findings suggest that market evaluations of Taiwanese family firms' M&As are driven by multiple factors, including transaction conditions and governance characteristics. This study provides investors with an objective reference for evaluating major M&As based on the acquirer's governance and substantive integration capabilities.

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