傳統探討利潤移轉的租稅競爭模式之文獻中，對於廠商的設定大多採取私營廠商的模式進行，然而，即使在當代貿易自由化以及公營企業民營化的思維下，公部門對整個經濟體系的影響還是相當深遠，也使得在混合寡占市場下探討租稅競爭的議題顯得相當重要。實際上目前有許多開發中國家以及已開發國部分產業仍維持國營的或半民營化的型態，而在現今開放經濟體系中租稅競爭越來越受到重視，自不能將這些廠商排除在外。而自1980年代以來各國陸陸續續在開啟民營化事業，更凸顯出民營化議題與租稅競爭的重要性。是以本文建立一個包含民營化廠商的租稅競爭模型，分別在古諾納徐 (Cournot-Nash) 的數量競爭以及柏川德 (Bertrand-Nash) 價格競爭兩種模式下，探討民營化程度對租稅競爭的影響，文中有幾點重要的發現：首先，不論是在數量競爭或價格競爭模式下，當民營化程度高於某一水準時，所獲致的結果趨近於Lai (2006) 的結論，但是民營化效果的存在將緩和租稅競爭所導致的公共財低度提供的問題；其次，當民營化程度低於某一水準時，所獲致的結論在兩種競爭模型下皆明顯異於Lai (2006) 的結論。最後，數學模擬分析的結果顯示：不論是在數量競爭或是在價格競爭的模式下，民營化程度地提高將使得均衡下本國的稅率下降，而外國的稅率之影響方向則不明確地結論。

翁永和，羅鈺珊與劉碧珍 (2003)，〈市場結構與最適民營化政策〉，《經濟論文》，第31卷第2期，頁149-169。

邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006)，〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，第34卷第2期，頁246-259。

郭虹瑩(2011)，〈租稅競爭、公共財提供與廠商家數〉，《經濟研究》，第47卷第1期，頁27-44。

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