本研究將針對癮性商品這個主題，分三部分來探討。第一部份討論癮性商品之長期消費型態與影響因素；第二部份討論癮性商品管制政策的方向；第三部份討論考慮癮性商品的最適商品稅。癮性商品的特性為當期該商品的消費數量，會受到其前期消費數量的影響，常見的例子為香菸、酒精與毒品等。論文的第一部份採取理性上癮假設，建立一個代表性消費者的跨期消費模型，採最適控制的方法以導出癮性商品的長期消費途徑。文中也進一步探討各種外在因素如何影響癮性商品的消費。我們得出的結果如下：若有未預料到的癮性商品價格上升，將使癮性商品的長期消費減少。若癮性商品的價格上升是可預料的，則在調整價格前癮性商品的消費會上升；但在調整價格後，癮性商品的消費仍會減少。政府提供較充分的癮性商品資訊，將可減少癮性商品的長期消費。時間偏好率較高者，癮性商品的長期消費會較多。

當癮性商品具劣價財性質時，消費者的健康風險認知將受扭曲，即使是追求個人的效用極大化的理性消費者，對癮性商品的消費決策仍將偏離個人最適與社會最適。政府適時的干預，將可改善資源配置與提高社會福利水準。 因此，在第二部份中我們將討論癮性商品管制政策的方向。政府可採直接管制，限制消費者每一期的癮性商品消費數量， 或藉由教育、提供資訊來改變個人的健康風險認知；政府也可採間接管制，提供經濟誘因使消費者自行修正對癮性商品的消費，最普遍的方式為租稅制度的調整。決定最適管制原則的因素包括：健康風險認知的扭曲程度、癮性商品存量對個人身心健康的影響、癮性商品存量的影子價格對癮性商品消費的影響、時間偏好率、折舊率，與癮性商品的價格彈性。

最後我們探討當經濟體系中存在癮性商品時，最適商品稅的課稅原則。在著名的最適商品稅理論 Ramsey rule中，主張商品稅的稅率應與課稅所造成之補償性需求的負面影響成反比。然而由於癮性商品具有跨期消費相關的性質，考慮癮性商品之最適商品稅顯然將更為複雜。本文延續第一部份所建構之代表性消費者的跨期消費模型， 藉由代表跨期間接效用的 Bellman value function,求導政府固定稅收目標下的最適間接稅結構。 根據模型推導所得到的課稅原則如下：當癮性商品存量的影子價格大於零時，代表癮性商品存量的累積將對個人身心健康產生正面影響。此時應對癮性商品及其具效用互補性的一般商品課較低的稅率,並應對其具效用替代性的一般商品課較高的稅率。當癮性商品存量的影子價格小於零時，代表癮性商品存量的累積將對個人身心健康產生負面影響，此時應對癮性商品及其具效用互補性的一般商品課較高的稅率，並應對其具效用替代性的一般商品課較低的稅率。此外，最適租稅稅率的訂定仍須衡量課稅使長期所得下降的幅度、癮性商品存量的影子價格， 與癮性商品存量的價格敏感度等因素。

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