2020年至今，新冠肺炎疫情對全球桌上型電腦市場帶來深遠影響。疫情期間居家辦公與居家上課帶動個人電腦需求短期激增，但後疫情時期市場呈現結構性萎縮，全球出貨量自2019年的九千多萬台逐步下滑至2028年預估的六千七百四十萬台。在此一需求遞減的同時，桌上型電腦電源供應器市場卻有更多新進競爭者加入，包括跨界的板卡廠、生態系整合者、以及挾低價優勢之純貼牌商，使整體市場呈現典型的紅海競爭。傳統零組件品牌廠商在此三方夾擊的結構中，承受最為劇烈的策略衝擊。
本研究以後疫情時期之桌上型電腦電源供應器產業為背景，運用 Brandenburger 與 Nalebuff（1996）之競合策略與價值網模型、柏氏（Bertrand）之完全資訊靜態賽局、Akerlof（1970）與 Spence（1973）之資訊不對稱與傳訊理論、以及 Schelling（1960）之承諾價值與完全資訊動態賽局等四項理論工具，建構多層次的策略分析框架。在實證探討上，本研究以 X 公司作為「傳統零組件專門品牌—工程主導型」之代表性個案，就其可能採取之四項策略選項（價格競爭、低價標案競逐、跨界 B2B 市場、研發投資差異化）進行賽局模擬與分析。
研究結果顯示， X 公司若僅採純貼牌或低價競標路線，將陷入柏氏競爭並承受資訊不對稱所帶來的品質與品牌風險；唯有貫徹「承諾的價值」核心戰略：透過策略性投資自建研發團隊，並輔以共同開發、生態系綑綁、迴避零附加價值賽局等三項配套方案，方能主動創造附加價值、改變賽局規則、建構長期的品牌力。本研究進一步將上述方案轉化為短期的資源聚焦，於中期布局策略轉型，以及長期建構技術護城河之三階段執行步驟，使有限資源能於短中長期同步推進。研究結果可為傳統零組件品牌商於面對紅海競爭時之策略決策提供有意義的學理支撐與實務啟發。

Since 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly reshaped the global desktop PC market. While remote working and learning during the pandemic temporarily boosted PC demand, the post-pandemic era has witnessed a structural contraction, with global shipments declining from over 91 million units in 2019 to a projected 67.4 million units by 2028. Despite this declining demand, the desktop PC power supply unit (PSU) market has attracted an increasing number of new entrants, including motherboard and graphics card manufacturers, ecosystem integrators, and pure private-labeling brands leveraging low-cost advantages, turning the market into a typical red-ocean market. Traditional component brands therefore face particularly intense strategic pressure under this threesided competitive structure. This research applies four theoretical frameworks to construct a multi-layered strategic analysis: (1) the co-opetition strategy and Value Net model by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996); (2) Bertrand competition under static games of complete information; (3) information asymmetry and signaling theory developed by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973); and (4) the value of commitment in dynamic games of complete information by Schelling (1960). This study selects X Company, a traditional specialist brand in PC components with an engineering-driven operating model, as the case company and conducts game-theoretic simulations on four strategic options: price competition, low-price bidding, cross-sector expansion into B2B markets, and R&Ddriven differentiation.
The findings indicate that if X Company relies solely on either a pure private-label model or low-price bidding, it will be drawn into Bertrand competition while facing quality and brand risks arising from information asymmetry. Only by implementing the “value of commitment” as its core strategy, through strategically investing in and building an in-house R&D team, complemented by three supporting measures, namely co-development, ecosystem bundling, and the avoidance of zero-value-added games, can the company proactively create added value, reshape the rules of competition, and build long-term brand strength. This study further translates these measures into a threephase implementation path: resource prioritization in the short term, laying the groundwork for strategic transformation in the medium term, and building a technological moat in the long term. This approach enables limited resources to advance in parallel across short-, medium-, and long-term horizons. The findings provide meaningful theoretical support and practical insights for the strategic decision-making of traditional component brands facing red-ocean competition.

一、外文文獻
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二、中文文獻（含中譯本）
1. 布蘭登伯格（Brandenburger, A. M.）、奈勒波夫（Nalebuff, B. J.）著，黃婉華、馮勃翰譯（2015），《競合策略：商業運作的真實力量》（二十周年經典版），台北：雲夢千里文化。
2. 克里斯汀生（Christensen, C. M.）著，吳凱琳譯（2007），《創新的兩難》，台北：商周出版。
3. 阿維納什．迪克西特（Avinash Dixit）、貝利．奈勒波夫（Barry J. Nalebuff）著，董志強、王爾山、李文霞譯（2016），《思辨賽局：看穿局勢、創造優勢的策略智慧》，台北市：商業周刊出版。
三、產業報告與市場研究
1. Credit Suisse (2023 年 1 月)，《Asia Technology Sector – PC Industry Update》研究報告。
2. Gartner (2022 年 5 月)，《Forecast: Global Semiconductor Market》研究報告。
3. International Data Corporation (IDC) (2021). Worldwide Quarterly Personal Computing Device Tracker.
4. International Data Corporation (IDC) (2024). Worldwide Quarterly Server Tracker.
5. Morgan Stanley (2024 年 5 月)，《Global PC Outlook》研究報告。
6. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010). Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Washington, D.C.
7. 工研院產業科學國際所（2022），引用 Gartner 2022 年 5 月「全球半導體市場預測」資料。
四、網路資料來源
1. ASUS ROG (n.d.). How to Choose a Power Supply for Your New Gaming PC. Retrieved from https://rog.asus.com/us/articles/guides/how-to-choose-a-power-supply-for-your-new-gaming-pc/
2. Beanstalk Computers (n.d.). PSU Specs Explained. Retrieved from https://beanstalk.io/psu-specs-explained/
3. Cooler Master (n.d.). What is 80 PLUS Efficiency? Retrieved from https://www.coolermaster.com/zh-tw/guide-and-resources/what-is-80-plus-efficiency/
4. Cultists Network (2023). PSU Cultists – Power Supply Unit Database. Retrieved from https://cultists.network/psucultists/
5. Intel Corporation (2024). ATX Version 3.1 Multi Rail Desktop Platform Power Supply Design Guide. Retrieved from https://edc.intel.com/
6. Plug Load Solutions (n.d.). 80 PLUS Certified Power Supplies and Manufacturers. Retrieved from https://www.plugloadsolutions.com/80PlusPowerSupplies.aspx