We attempt to analyze why the adoption of the mobile number portability policy incurs no (or very little) effect in encouraging competition in the telecommunication market. The cause is related to network externality. The level of network externality can be characterized by the proportion of any individual’s friends who are also adopting in the same carrier as the individual does. We find that such network externality may prohibit competition in the telecommunication market when termination-based pricing is prevailing. When termination-based pricing is prohibited, carriers cannot take advantage of network externality. We characterize the conditions such that without termination-based pricing, carriers become more competitive and consumers benefit more than with termination-based prices. Our study provides insightful implication on how to effectively impose the mobile number portability policy to improve competition in the telecommunication market.

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