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| 研究生： |
陳欣怡 CHEN, XIN-YI |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
合作對局與雙方配對 |
| 指導教授： | 李子壩 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
商學院 - 統計學系 Department of Statistics |
| 論文出版年： | 1992 |
| 畢業學年度： | 80 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 68 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：141 下載：0 |
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第一章 前言.................... 1
第二章 對局理論的基本概念
第一節 轉換效用N 人合作對局.................... 3
第二節 非轉換效用N 人合作對局.................... 12
第三節 合作對局-核的存在性.................... 14
第三章 雙方配對問題
第一節 穩定的婚姻配對....................27
第二節 穩定婚姻配對和合作對局.................... 35
第四章 指派對局
第一節 指派對局的模式....................38
第二節 買方策略....................44
第五章 對稱的成對交易分配
第一節 對稱的成對交易分配模式的建立....................53
第二節 對稱的成對交易分配的求法及性質....................58
第六章 結論....................66
參考文獻.................... 67
一、中文書目：
(1) 李子壩，"新制大學聯考分發問題之分析"，數學傳播，7卷3期，民國72年9月.
(2) ──，"大學聯招同分增額錄取模式的研究"，國科會報告，民國79年8月.
二、英文書目：
[1] Crawford,Vincent P. and Elsie, Marie Knoer( 1981 )," Job Matching With Heterogeneous Firms and I,i'ilorkers" ,Econometrica,49,437-450.
[2] Debreu, G. and Scarf, H.(1963)," A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy", International Economic Review,4,235-246.
[3] Demange,Gabrielle and David, Gale(1985),"The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets" , Econometrica,53,873-888.
[4] Fred, S. Roberts(1976),Discrete Mathematical Model, Prentice-Hall, Englewood.
[5] Gusfield, D. and Ivring, R.W.(1989), The Stable Marria.ge Problem: Structure and Algorithm, MIT, Cambridge, Press.
[6] Herve, M.(1988),Axioms of cooperative Decision M aking, Cambridge Univ. Press.
[7] James, W. Friedman(1991),Game Theorys With Applications to. Ecnomics, Oxford, Univ. Press.
[8] Kelso, Alexander S.,Jr. and Crawford, Vincent P.(1982)," Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes" ,Econometrica,50,1483-1504.
[9] Liu,C.L.(1977),Element of Discrete Mathematics, McGraw-Hill, New York.
[10] Lovasz, L. and Plummer, M.(1986),Matching Theory, North-holland, Amsterdam.
[l1] Marilda, S. and Roth, A.E.(1988),"Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets" ,Journal of Economic Theory,45,85-101.
[12] Rochford, C. Sharon( 1984),"Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained Allocations in a Assignment Market" ,Journal of Economic Theory,34,263-281.
[13] Rosenmulier,J.(1981), The Theory of Games and Markets, North-Holland company.
[14] Roth, A.E.(1979),Axiomatic Models of Bagaining,Springer-Verleg.
[15] (1984)," Stability and Polarization of Interests In Job Matching" ,Econometrica, 52,47-57.
[16] Roth A.E. and Sotomayor Marilda( 1991), Two-Sided Matching A Study In Game Theoretic Modelling and Analysis, Cambridge, Univ. Press.
[17] Scarf, E. Herbert(1967)"The Core of an N Person Game" ,Econometrica, 35,51-69.
[18] Scarf, E.H. and Hansen Terje( 1973), The Computation of Economic Equilibria, Yale Univ. Press.
[19] Shapley, L.S. and Herbert Scarf(1974),"On Cores and Indivisibility", Journal of Mathematical Econometrics,I,23-28.
[20] Shapley, L.S. and Shubik M.(1972),"The Assignment Game I :The Core", International Journal of Game Theory,1,,111-130.
[21] Shapley, L.S. and Gale, D.(1962),"College admissions and the stability of Marriage" ,Amer. Math.Monthly,69,9-15.
[22] Shubik, Martin(1982), Game Theory In the Social Sciences Concepts and Solutions, MIT Press, Cambridge.
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