策略性股權投資係企業取得關鍵資源與控制權之重要途徑，惟當投資標的為家族企業時，其成敗高度取決於目標公司之家族治理結構、派系動態及外部競爭者介入等多重因素之交互作用。本研究以 P 公司對 T 公司之策略性股權投資事件為個案，探討食品飲料產業以取得通路資源為目的之策略性收購、家族企業對外部投資者之防禦邏輯，以及外部投資者可行之管理策略。
透過公開資訊觀測站、公司年報及媒體報導之事件歷程分析，本研究歸納出四項理論延伸。第一，收購方於關鍵時點之決策節奏延宕，稱為「收購方之決策節奏問題」。第二，白馬騎士於中長期可能實質轉化為新的控制權競爭者，形成「假性白馬騎士」與「盟友轉換風險」現象。第三，家族企業之防禦邏輯由「保全控制權」演化為「資產與控制權分離」進階模式，即家族大股東可能主動處分核心策略資產，阻絕外部投資者取得關鍵價值。第四，被收購者於控制權競逐過程中，具備主動消滅自身策略性資源之能力，稱為「策略性資源之可消滅性」。
本研究之觀察對外部策略投資者、家族企業經營者及主管機關均具實務啟示，並就策略性股權投資與家族企業治理相關理論提供新的分析視角。

Strategic equity investment is a key means by which firms acquire critical resources and secure corporate control. When the target is a family business, however, its outcome depends largely on how the target’s family governance structure, factional dynamics, and external competitor intervention interact. Situated in Taiwan’s food and beverage industry, this study takes P Company’s strategic equity investment in T Company as a case study, examining the strategic acquisition motivated by distribution-channel resources, the defensive logic that family firms adopt against external investors, and the managerial strategies available to such investors.
Drawing on an event-history analysis of data from the Market Observation Post System (MOPS), corporate annual reports, and media coverage, this study identifies four theoretical extensions. First, an acquirer’s delays at key decision points are termed the “acquirer’s decision-cadence problem.” Second, a white knight may substantively evolve into a new contender for corporate control, giving rise to the “pseudo white knight” and “ally-shift risk” phenomena. Third, family firms’ defensive logic advances from “preserving control” to an “asset–control separation” model, whereby the controlling family may proactively divest core strategic assets to prevent external investors from capturing the underlying value. Fourth, target firms may actively eliminate their own strategic resources during a contest for control, a phenomenon termed the “dispensability of strategic resources.”
These findings offer practical implications for external strategic investors, family business operators, and regulators, and contribute a new analytical perspective to the theoretical literature on strategic equity investment and family business governance.

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