本研究以一家正處於規模快速擴張階段的滅菌醫材包材製造企業（S公司）為研究對象，探討資本密集型企業在大規模廠房建置與人力擴編的過渡期間，既有以每股盈餘（EPS）達成率為核心連動指標的年終獎金制度，所產生的結構性失配問題及其調整方向。
現行制度的核心困境在於三個相互疊加的機制：新廠折舊費用大幅壓縮EPS，使指標變動與員工實際付出之努力脫鉤；提前到位的擴編人力稀釋既有獎金池，導致實際分配到的獎金因此下滑；不同部門的績效貢獻與EPS之間存在程度不一的時間落差，削弱了制度連結努力與報酬的效力。上述三者共同造成員工努力投入與獎酬回饋之間的失配。
本研究採質性單一個案研究法，透過對三位高階管理者（總經理、生產製造部協理、業務部協理）進行半結構式深度訪談，並輔以公司內部年終獎金辦法及相關學術文獻進行三角檢核。研究發現，員工對於現行制度的看法會因層級的不同而產生些許差異：高階管理者能掌握並知悉擴張期間EPS下降的情況，且對具體可信的長期激勵承諾存有強烈期待；中階幹部因資訊取得受限，公平感知落差較大；基層員工與移工則以固定薪資及加班費的穩定性為首要留任條件，對浮動獎酬制度的認同相對有限。
基於訪談資料與相關理論的交互分析，本研究提出短、中、長期三個層次的制度調整建議：短期以固定月數制年終獎金取代EPS連動，並研議採用調整後獲利指標作為過渡期補充依據；中期建立「總體指標決定獎金是否發放、部門與個人KPI決定發放額度」的雙層多元指標體系，並依職級差異建構分層激勵架構；長期則在條件具備時引入認股計畫或股票選擇權等長期激勵工具，將中高階管理者的報酬結構與公司中長期發展目標緊密綁定。三位受訪者亦一致揭示，理想獎酬制度應以公平、透明、簡單、及時為核心設計原則，且須於績效期開始前事前公告，方能形成有效的行為引導機制。

This study examines a sterilized medical packaging manufacturer (S Company) that has been undergoing rapid scale expansion, focusing on how its existing annual bonus system — which links payouts directly to earnings per share (EPS) achievement — becomes structurally misaligned during a period of large-scale factory construction and workforce expansion, and what adjustments should be made in response.
The core problem stems from three compounding mechanisms occurring simultaneously. First, depreciation charges from the new factory significantly compress EPS, meaning the metric moves independently of how hard employees actually work. Second, newly hired staff — brought on ahead of the factory's launch — begin drawing from the bonus pool before overall profitability has caught up, causing each individual's actual payout to shrink. Third, the time lag between different departments' performance contributions and their eventual reflection in EPS varies considerably, further weakening the system's ability to connect effort with reward. Together, these three factors produce a meaningful disconnect between what employees put in and what they get back.
The study adopts a qualitative single-case research design. Data were collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews with three senior managers — the General Manager, the Deputy Manager of Production and Manufacturing, and the Deputy Manager of Sales — and triangulated against the company's internal bonus policy documentation and relevant academic literature. The findings reveal a clear stratification in how employees at different levels experience the current system. Senior managers generally understand that EPS compression during an expansion phase is structurally inevitable, but they hold strong expectations for concrete and credible long-term incentive commitments. Mid-level supervisors, with less access to the full strategic picture, experience a sharper sense of unfairness when their bonuses shrink. Front-line employees and migrant workers, meanwhile, prioritize stable base salaries and overtime pay above all else, and show limited engagement with variable bonus arrangements tied to company-wide financial metrics.
Drawing on the interview findings and theoretical frameworks, this study proposes a three-horizon set of recommendations. In the short term, the annual bonus for front-line employees should be decoupled from EPS and restructured as a fixed-month payout determined by individual performance ratings; an adjusted profit metric that excludes part of the depreciation impact should also be considered as a supplementary benchmark during the transition. In the medium term, a two-tier indicator framework should replace the current single EPS threshold — with aggregate metrics determining whether bonuses are paid out at all, and department- and individual-level KPIs determining how much each person receives — supported by a tiered incentive structure differentiated by employee level. In the long term, once conditions allow, the company should introduce equity-based incentive instruments such as employee stock ownership plans or stock options for mid- and senior-level managers, anchoring their compensation to the company's medium- and long-term development targets. Across all three interviews, a consistent set of design principles emerged: a good incentive system must be fair, transparent, simple, and timely — and crucially, the rules must be communicated to employees before the performance period begins in order to effectively shape behavior.

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