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研究生： 林耿涵
論文名稱： 台灣銀行業偵測中國財務舞弊之研究─公開資訊之運用
Research on Taiwan commercial banks' detection of financial fraud in China: The use of public information
指導教授： 吳文傑
Wu, Jack
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 商學院 - 國際經營管理英語碩士學位學程(IMBA)
International MBA Program College of Commerce(IMBA)
論文出版年： 2016
畢業學年度： 104
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 46
中文關鍵詞： 金融詐騙 、會計 、中國 、信用風險 、銀行業
外文關鍵詞： Financial Fraud, Accounting, China, Credit Risk, Banking
相關次數： 點閱：131  下載：20 
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    • International loan is a very important business for Taiwan commercial banks, and China is the largest credit market for Taiwan banks. However, when doing due diligence or credit risk research for Chinese companies, Taiwan commercial banks are facing difficulties and risks such as difficulty to monitor the company, a decelerating Chinese economy growth and other risk factors. Because of these difficulties, the common method used for international loan due diligence in Taiwan is not adequate to cope with the current credit risk situation.
    There were two famous Chinese default cases in Taiwan during 2014, in which the thesis picks the Ultrasonic AG financial fraud case as an example. The Ultrasonic AG case shows that it is possible to use public information to detect and prevent financial frauds. Based on the case study, the thesis suggests Taiwan commercial banks could use a more comprehensive method of due diligence, to increase the accuracy of credit research. In the end, the thesis also suggests a KL credit scoring system, based on past financial frauds, to assist in credit research. By utilizing a more comprehensive method of due diligence and KL score system with traditional models, Taiwan commercial banks could better detect and prevent international financial frauds, especially financial frauds in China.

    1. Introduction: The Growth of International Loan from Taiwan Commercial Banks, and the Importance of Chinese Market 1
    2. The Difficulties and Potential Risks during International Loan due Diligence, and Risks Involved in Chinese Company Loans 3
    2.1. Difficulty to Monitor the International Companies 3
    2.2. Difficult to Conduct Accurate Market Research 3
    2.3. Lacking of Access to First-hand Local Financial Statements 4
    2.4. Chinese Companies Could Conduct Financial Frauds in Foreign Financial Markets Without Consequences to the Controller 5
    2.5. Chinese Economy Growth Decelerating While the NPL Ratio Raises 5
    2.6. Even Big Four Auditing Firms Could not Prevent All Frauds 7
    3. The Common Method of International Loan due Diligence in Taiwan, and the Shortfalls 8
    4. Chinese Financial Fraud Case Study: Ultrasonic AG Syndicated Loan Default and Bankruptcy 10
    4.1. Case Introduction 10
    4.1.1. Company Introduction of Ultrasonic AG 10
    4.1.2. Overview of the Ultrasonic AG Syndicated Loan 12
    4.2. Red Flags Taishin Financial Holdings Found in the Ultrasonic AG Case 12
    4.2.1. Red Flag 1: Contradicting Brand Stories Which Lack Credibility 13
    4.2.2. Red Flag 2: Same Gross Margin for Vastly Different Products 15
    4.2.3. Red Flag 3: Unusually Stable Gross, Operating and Profit Margins Across Multiple Accounting Periods 17
    4.2.4. Red Flag 4: The Unusually Stable Margins Trend of Ultrasonic AG Is Vastly Different from Industry Trend 19
    4.2.5. Red Flag 5: Balance Sheet and Statement of Cash Flow Suggests No Need for Borrowing Funds 20
    4.3. The Ultrasonic AG Default and Aftermath 23
    4.4. Summary of the Ultrasonic AG Financial Fraud Case 27
    5. Suggestion: A Comprehensive Method for International Loan due Diligence to Prevent Chinese Financial Frauds, and a New Credit Scoring System 29
    5.1. Comprehensive Method for International Loan due Diligence 29
    5.2. KL Credit Scoring System 31
    5.3. Testing of KL Credit Scoring System on Chinese Fraud/Credit Event Cases 39
    6. Conclusion 42
    Reference 44

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