本論文探討 2017 年至 2026 年初之韓中貿易關係，旨在分析貿易夥伴多元化如何影響經濟安全。本研究目標在於證實，在「相互依賴武器化」的薩德（THAAD）脅迫事件發生僅數年後，南韓對中國的不對稱依賴，如何導致其過度暴露於衝擊之中，進而使南韓必須聚焦於多元化發展，以提升其經濟安全。本研究採用「順序解釋性混合方法」（sequential explanatory mixed-methods approach），首先透過量化研究，利用迴歸模型以及「懲罰廣義加法模型」（penalized GAM）等非線性模型，探究貿易夥伴多元化（TPD）對經濟安全的影響。量化結果顯示，貿易夥伴多元化對經濟安全具有統計上的顯著影響，進而引發對韓中貿易關係的個案研究。
個案研究部分，首先透過「論述—歷史分析法」（Discourse – Historical Approach, DHA）追蹤南韓領導層的修辭演變，並分析其修辭如何對應雙邊貿易動態之政策轉變。接著，本研究提出一套邏輯模型以論證因果關係，追蹤薩德脅迫後的經濟衝擊（如「中國製造 2025」與 COVID-19）如何促使企業與政府採取應對措施，將貿易夥伴多元化列為優先要務，以達成對中「去風險化」並抵禦未來衝擊。研究結果顯示，南韓企業與政府均已意識到對中不對稱依賴的相關風險；儘管已在關鍵領域採取行動提升貿易夥伴多元化，但仍面臨諸多障礙，且此種政策轉向是否能在南韓這個民主國家長期維持，仍有待觀察。

This thesis covers South Korea – China trade relations from 2017 to early 2026 to analyze how trade partner diversity impacts economic security. The research objective is to prove that South Korea’s asymmetric dependence on China led to overexposure to shocks, just a few years after the THAAD coercion that weaponized interdependence, thereby requiring South Korea to focus on diversification to improve economic security. By employing a sequential explanatory mixed-methods approach, this thesis will first utilize quantitative methods in the form of regression models, as well as non-linear models, like a penalized generalized additive model (GAM) to uncover the effects of trade partner diversity (TPD) on economic security. The quantitative findings indicate that TPD has a statistically significant effect on economic security, which leads to the case study on South Korea – China trade relations. First, a Discourse – Historical Approach analysis (DHA) is conducted to track changes in rhetoric from South Korean leadership and how the rhetoric corresponded to policy changes relevant to bilateral trade dynamics. Then, a logic model is presented to prove causality by tracking how the economic shocks experienced after the THAAD coercion, (Made in China 2025 and COVID-19), have led to firm and government responses prioritizing TPD to derisk from China and insulate from further shocks (thereby improving economic security). The findings of the case study indicate that both firms and the South Korean government have recognized the risks associated with asymmetric dependence on China, and while actions have been taken to increase TPD in key sectors, many hurdles persist and it remains to be seen if this will be a long-term policy shift in the democratic nation of South Korea.

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