本研究由個人參與社區發展行動的動機與選擇決策作為研究的重心， 以理性選擇行為模式為理論基礎，探討社區發展上如何才能克服集體行動的困境，建立永續性的自主治理機制。由於社區事務具有小規模共用資源（Common-Pool Resources；CPRs）的特性，在功能上及產權上無法分割，在使用上無排他性（non- exclusive）但具有某種程度的敵對性（rivalry），過度取用將產生資源耗竭的現象。因此本研究援引共用資源分析方法（Common-Pool Resources Approach）作為分析架構，從個人選擇與互動形式、外部環境與技術的變量以及組織與執行機制三方面，探討社區居民是否形成自主治理的集體行動及其影響變量。
在理論的實證上，為避免出現統計式概化（statistical generalization）的誤謬，本研究採用多重個案研究的複現方法，選取了三處遭遇特定事件觸發了社群共同議題，而由外力團隊協助建立治理組織之社區，作為實證研究之個案。包括：（1）南投縣中寮鄉的農村社區在歷經九二一大地震後，面對土地資源永續利用與產業轉型的議題；（2）桃園縣龍潭鄉百年大鎮大型住宅社區因社區組織不健全，導致社區環境出現安全問題；（3）台北縣鶯歌鎮陶瓷老街因政策獲選為形象商圈，店家面臨商圈環境管理與商圈行銷議題。
研究結果發現中寮農村社區由於結合生活、生產與生態的社區營造模式，藉由外力團隊在知識及技術的支援下，累積了知識資本與人力資本；並且在既有鄰里網絡關係下建立了直接對話的社區公共論壇，經由討論形成的共識幫助居民建立合作的內部規範，培養互信、互惠的基礎，進而累積當地社群的社會資本。因此，居民能夠從不同的困境與衝突中解脫出來，從以往頻次獨自決策的行為，轉為循序漸進、權變的和頻次依賴的決策，成功的將政府所提供短期的物質性誘因，轉變為可持續的目的性誘因及社群性誘因，促成集體合作的社區發展自主治理模式。
在百年大鎮的個案中，由於社區規模過大，居民們多是短期內由外地移入，整體社群網絡關係薄弱；雖然建商在開發初期已委託外力團隊建立治理組織與規則，但後續卻未能在社區內建立直接溝通的平台，凝聚居民共識累積社會資本。因此社區公共事務的治理只能依賴權威的外部制度規則的強制力，雖然可以實現集體行動的自主治理機制，維持社區資源系統的存量，但因社群共同行為的內在規範約束力薄弱，集體行動的執行成本極高。
在鶯歌老街商圈社區的個案中，由於店家之間利益異質性高，缺乏衝突解決機制，且資源佔用與提供的邊界不清楚，造成治理效益外溢情形嚴重；雖然具有小規模社群的優勢，卻未能順利將政府的物質性誘因轉變為目的性誘因，建立可持續的自主治理制度規則，對搭便車及違規行為無力制止，因此在外力團隊撤出之後，集體行動的自主治理機制即已無法發揮功效。
觀諸目前政府在推動社區營造時，常見的作法是以經費補助作為啓動的誘因，即是以政策誘因或物質性誘因來克服集體行動的一階困境。同時政府也會委聘外力團隊提供知識、技術或人力，協助強化社區組織的運作能力，以及制定集體行動的行為規範並監督執行效果，以此克服集體行動的二階及三階困境。但若未能像中寮社區一樣，引導社區將物質性誘因透過制度規則的調整，轉變為目的性誘因，以及運用論壇、協商等機制強化集體學習與逐次的轉化，累積社會資本形成社群性誘因，則一旦外部資源不再繼續提供，社群成員的賽局報酬結構仍舊回復到囚犯困境，社區自主治理終將無法持續。
因此，未來政府在社區的發展政策應引導社區建立具有靈活性、特定行動意識的社區組織，運用政策機制將物質性誘因質變為目的性誘或社群性誘因來克服集體行動的困境，激發社區居民提出保證承諾的安全賽局模式，社區自主治理才能朝向持續（永續）的發展。

Base on the theory of reasonable choice behavior mode, the study focus on the resident’s individual motive and decision making process trying to identify the solutions of breaking the bottlenecks of collective actions and build up the sustainable self-government mechanism. The community affairs are small scale common-pool resources CPRs) therefore we cannot clearly dive up their ownerships and functions. In the aspects of usage, the community affairs are non-exclusive but kind of rivalry. It will be decreased if being over-deprived. Thus, this study adopted the common-pool resources approach as the analytical structure to explore if the community residents have organized the collective actions of self-government and the influence variables form 3 major aspects of “individual choice vs. interactive form”, “external environment vs. technical variables” and “organization vs. enforcement mechanism ”.
In the empirical level of the theory, to avoid the bias of statistical generalization, the study took the reentrant methods of multiple cases. The study took 3 occasional events which touched off some common agenda in the community and have the residents established the organizations of governance by the assistance of external teams as the impractical cases. The three cases included: (1)The agenda faced by rural villages on the aspects of land sustainable usage and industrial transformation in Jhingliao Township of Nantou County, (2) The safety problems brought by the poor community organization of the big scale residential community—Netown in Longtan Township of Taoyuan County.(3) The marketing and business district environment management issues brought by being selected as the official model business district in the Yingge Township of Taipei County.
The results of the study showed the rural villages in Jhingliao raised the knowledge and manpower capitals through the intellectual and knowledge supports form the external teams. Also, they build up a forum for direct dialogues among existing networks of village neighborhoods. Through the consensuses through the internal discussion, the residents built up the internal norms and cultivated the common ground of mutual trust and mutual benefits and further more accumulate the social capital for the local communities. Therefore, the residents were liberated from various predicaments and conflicts. They successfully transformed the short-term material supports form the government to sustainable purpose-specific and community incentives to shape the self-government mode of collective cooperation of community.
For the case of the Bainian Community, because of the over sized community scale, the overall community networking relationship is weak. Even though in the early stage of the development, the external team have help the residents to build up the governance organization and norms. But, due to the lack of direct communication platform to shape the consensus among the residents and raise the social capital, the community public affairs could only be governed by rules made by the external authoritative systems—the Apartment Building Regulations. The facility building and maintenance and the regulation of the violation behavior was enforced by the external administrator. Although, through the model, the self-government mechanism of the collective actions can be delivered and maintain the community resource storage, the cost for enforcing the collective activity is very high due to the weak interior constrains within the community collective actions.
In the case of Yingge Old Street Business District, due to the big heterogeneity of interest among the shops, the lack of conflict mediation mechanisms and the resource occupancy range and borderline are vague, the governance effect spilled seriously. Although the community has the superiority of smaller scale, it failed to transform the material incentives provided by the government to purpose-specific incentive to establish a sustainable governance rules and could not stop the free riders’ infringements. Therefore, after the external team retreated, the self-government mechanism for the collective actions failed to perform its functions neither.
At present, the commonest incentive offered by the government on promoting the community empowermentis providing the subsidiary. In other words, the government solves the predicaments of the first stage by offering the policy or material incentives. In the mean time, the government hires external teams to provide the communities knowledge, technology and manpower supports to strengthen the community organizations’ operational abilities and help them to set up the norms of the collective actions and supervise the implementation. Through this, the government tries to solve the second and third stage predicaments. But, if it fails to guide the community to transform the material incentives to purpose-specific incentive through adjusting the rules of the systems and utilize the mechanism of forum and negotiation to strengthen the collective learning and gradual transform to raise the social capital to form the community incentives, once, the external resource supply not available any more, the game reward structure of the community members will be back to prison’s dilemma and the community self-government will not exist anymore.
As a conclusion, as the community development policy maker, the government should guide the communities to build up a community with flexibility and specific consciousness for action. Also, the study suggest the government should leverage the policy mechanism to transform the material incentives in the purpose-specific incentives or community incentives to solve the predicaments of collective actions to facilitate the community residents to raise a safe game model of promises and guarantees. Only on the base, the community self-government can be developed in the direction of continuity (sustainability).

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