傳統保險經濟學多從資訊不對稱與理性預期效用的角度探討道德危險，卻難以解釋為何平時守法的保戶，會在小額理賠中進行輕微浮報——即本研究所稱之「小惡心理」。本研究結合行為財務學與行為倫理學，以自我維護理論（Self-Concept Maintenance Theory）與社會規範（Social Norms）為理論基礎，探討保戶如何在維持誠實自我形象與獲取額外理賠金之間尋求心理平衡。
　　本研究設計兩項獨立的情境實驗。實驗一以「行動裝置險」為情境，採單因子三組間設計（N = 341，操弄通過有效樣本 n = 218），檢驗理賠申請書中三種表頭聲明文字（一般聲明、誠實聲明含法律責任、社會規範）對浮報意圖之影響，並同步探討該助推設計對保戶「自我維護合理化」與「道德嚴重性感知」等心理機制變數之影響。實驗二以「汽車車體險」為情境，採單因子兩組間設計（N = 341，操弄通過有效樣本 n = 170），比較「大金控企業框架」與「互助資金池框架」對浮報意圖之影響，並以心理距離感知（M1）與道德罪惡感（M2）為中介變數，分別運用 Hayes（2022）PROCESS Macro Model 4 進行拔靴法中介效果檢定。
　　實驗一結果顯示，不同聲明文字對浮報意圖複合指標有顯著影響（F = 9.157, p < .001），其中誠實聲明組（M = 1.75）與社會規範組（M = 1.74）之浮報意圖均顯著低於控制組（M = 2.50）。此外，事後檢定證實，誠實聲明組與社會規範組在道德嚴重性感知上亦均顯著高於控制組，全面支持道德提醒助推設計之有效性。實驗二結果顯示，互助資金池框架對浮報意圖的總效果顯著（c = −0.935, p < .001），且透過心理距離感知（間接效果 = −0.773，Bootstrap 95% CI [−1.1202, −0.4528]）與道德罪惡感（間接效果 = −0.624，Bootstrap 95% CI [−0.9779, −0.3078]）之中介效果均達統計顯著，支持互助框架能同時透過縮短心理距離與提升罪惡感兩條路徑，顯著降低浮報意願。
　　本研究之理論貢獻在於將自我維護理論及解釋水平理論引入台灣產險本土情境，驗證行為財務學與行為倫理學機制在保險理賠行為中的適用性，並以中介模型揭示「互助框架」的作用機制。實務上，研究結果支持產險業者透過低成本的理賠表單設計優化（如加入誠實聲明或社會規範提示），以及品牌溝通策略轉型（將保險定位為社會互助機制），作為取代昂貴事後查核的「事前預防」風險管理工具。

Traditional insurance economics predominantly examines moral hazard through the lens of information asymmetry and rational expected utility theory, yet fails to explain why otherwise law-abiding policyholders engage in minor claim inflation—a phenomenon this study terms the "Small Evils Psychology." Drawing on behavioral finance and behavioral ethics, this study integrates Self-Concept Maintenance Theory and Social Norms theory to examine how policyholders achieve psychological equilibrium between preserving an honest self-image and extracting additional claim payments.
Two independent scenario experiments were designed. Experiment 1 employed a single-factor three-group design (N = 341; valid sample with manipulation check passed: n = 218) in the context of mobile device insurance to examine the effects of three claim form header declarations (standard declaration, honest declaration with legal liability, social norm) on fraud intent, as well as their impacts on self-justification and perceived moral severity as underlying psychological mechanisms. Experiment 2 employed a single-factor two-group design (N = 341; valid sample with manipulation check passed: n = 170) in the context of auto body insurance to compare a "large conglomerate" frame versus a "mutual insurance pool" frame on fraud intent, with psychological distance (M1) and anticipated guilt (M2) as mediators tested via Hayes (2022) PROCESS Macro Model 4 with bootstrapping.
Results from Experiment 1 indicate that claim form declarations significantly influenced the composite fraud intent score (F = 9.157, p < .001), with the honest declaration group (M = 1.75) and social norm group (M = 1.74) both showing significantly lower fraud intent than the control group (M = 2.50). Additionally, post-hoc tests revealed that both the honest declaration and social norm groups demonstrated significantly heightened perceived moral severity compared to the control group, fully supporting the efficacy of the moral nudge designs. Results from Experiment 2 reveal that the mutual insurance pool frame exerted a significant total effect on fraud intent (c = −0.935, p < .001), with dual significant indirect effects through psychological distance (indirect effect = −0.773, Bootstrap 95% CI [−1.1202, −0.4528]) and anticipated guilt (indirect effect = −0.624, Bootstrap 95% CI [−0.9779, −0.3078]), supporting the hypothesis that the mutual frame reduces fraud intent through both pathways simultaneously.
Theoretically, this study contributes by applying Self-Concept Maintenance Theory and Construal Level Theory to the Taiwanese property-casualty insurance context, validating behavioral ethics mechanisms in insurance claims behavior, and establishing a dual-mediation model revealing the mechanism underlying "mutual framing" effects. Practically, findings support low-cost claim form design optimization (adding honest declarations or social norm cues) and brand communication strategy transformation (repositioning insurance as a social mutual aid mechanism) as cost-effective pre-emptive risk management tools for Property insurers.

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