本文主要探討廠商在進行生產活動而使用共同資源時，其所採取之防制策略及其市場均衡。以兩廠模型的賽局分析開始，分別假設防制投入與防制成效成固定關係與成正向關係。在防制投入與防制成效成固定關係下，探討廠商對於防制污染所採取的競爭策略和政府之污染稅政策是否有效；在防制投入與防制成效成正向關係下，分析廠商之間「只對總防制投入達成協議」、「對總產量與總防制投入都達成協議」之兩種勾結合作方式下，其防制污染策略及其均衡情形的不同。最後引進市場上存在有限數目多家廠商的演化性賽局模型，分析有防制污染投入與沒有防制污染投入這兩類廠商的家數比例如何隨時間而變動，並比較單期賽局之均衡與動態分析之長期均衡。

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