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研究生: 褚泓毅
Chu, Hong Yi
論文名稱: 不完全契約下外國供給者的研發行為
Foreign supplier's R&D activities under incomplete contracts
指導教授: 徐則謙
Hsu, Tse-Chien
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 商學院 - 國際經營與貿易學系
Department of International Business
論文出版年: 2011
畢業學年度: 99
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 27
中文關鍵詞: 跨國外包財產權理論研發行為
外文關鍵詞: Foreign Outsourcing, Property-right Theory, R&D
相關次數: 點閱:138下載:18
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  • 過去的文獻成功地運用不完全契約,解釋低資本密集的產業偏向採用外包合作而非垂直整合。然而,不完全契約理論卻忽略外包接單廠商自身的研發行為,尤其是在接單競爭被強化時。因此,我們延伸不完全契約模型,發現若接單廠商身處越資本密集的產業,越能從上游廠商奪取利潤,因此有更強的誘因從事研發活動。當接單競爭強化時,我們發現低資本密集的產業較不願意從事研發活動,甚至被市場淘汰,所以可以看到生產活動逐漸高資本密集的廠商或產業集中。另外我們利用計量模型驗證文章中的結論,並得到一致的結果。


    Previous study utilizes incomplete contracts theory to explains why industries with lower capital intensity adopt outsourcing policy instead of vertical integration. However, incomplete contracts is silent in explaining foreign supplier's R&D activities, especially when the competition is intensified. We extend the incomplete-contracting model, and discover that foreign supplier of higher capital intensity producer has a higher profit extracted from final-good producers. Such excess profit gives foreign supplier more incentive to engage in R&D activities. When competition is intensified, we also show that suppliers of less capital intensive producer spend less in R&D or may leave the market; therefore within an industry, factors are reallocated to suppliers of capital-intensive producers or toward suppliers in capital intensive
    industries. Econometric evidence we provide supports the prediction of the model.

    1. Introduction---------------------------1
    2. Theoretical Model----------------------5
    2.1 Producing in Home Country-------------7
    2.2 Outsourcing to Another Country--------7
    2.3 R&D Activities-----------------------11
    3. Empirical Evidence--------------------17
    3.1 Data---------------------------------17
    3.2 Result-------------------------------22
    4. Conclusion----------------------------25

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