本文主要是透過帕菲特（Derek Parfit）和莊子頓（Mark Johnston） 的爭論來闡明帕菲特的人格同一理論。除了著重說明帕菲特如何看待「人格同一」這個概念，以及他如何發展其理論外，更特別借重莊子頓對於帕菲特的批評，來對帕菲特的觀點進一步闡述。討論將聚焦於「人格同一是否重要」，我將透過他們對彼此的攻擊和回應來檢視其論證的合理性，並思考如何在符合前理論直覺的前提下，嘗試為帕菲特辯護。

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