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本論文主要在探討異質群體網路的建構問題。我們假設群體內及群體外的連結成本相同，但是不同群體內較常發生的問題不同，每個人均可能發生自己所屬群體內（較常發生）的問題以及非所屬群體（較不常發生）的問題。在這樣的假設下我們分別探討線性成本、邊際成本遞增下的對稱均衡及非對稱均衡。線性成本下，每個人會偏好擁有較多群體內連結數、較少群體外連結數，而連結強度不是1就是0，但是1或0是經濟個體的內生選擇，和Jackson and Rogers(2005)、Galeotti et al.(2006)假設強度不是1就是0的情況不同。當邊際成本為遞增，多數時候人們會偏好較多、較強的群體內連結;較少、較弱的群體外連結，所以遞增成本模型可以解釋現實社會人們傾向和同群體的人保持較多、較強關係的現像。
若每個人的潛在可連結數一樣，則無論在線性成本或邊際成本遞增之下，對稱均衡都是最有效率的均衡型態;而若每個人潛在可連結數不一樣，經濟個體較有意願跟潛在可連結數較小的人維持較緊密的關係。另外，和線性成本比較，若邊際成本是遞增型態，就某個群體內的連結狀況來說，經濟個體會偏好較多連結數、較弱強度的模式，因此群體內的群聚現像明顯，符合實證研究的結果。
第一章.前言及文獻探討............1
第二章.線性成本模型..............7
第一節.模型建立.................7
第二節.對稱均衡.................9
第三節.非對稱均衡...............25
第三章.邊際成本遞增模型..........30
第一節.對稱均衡.................30
第二節.非對稱均衡...............40
第四章.文章總結.................43
附錄...........................44
參考文獻.......................61
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