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研究生： 司宇文
Sylvain, Senechal
論文名稱： 台灣家族企業的經營績效：時間序列分析
Performance of Family Controlled Firms in Taiwan: A Time Series Analysis
指導教授： 傅冶天
Fu, Ted
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 商學院 - 國際經營管理英語碩士學位學程(IMBA)
International MBA Program College of Commerce(IMBA)
論文出版年： 2008
畢業學年度： 97
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 33
中文關鍵詞： 台灣家族企業
相關次數： 點閱：196  下載：106 
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    • 台灣家族企業的經營績效


    This paper focuses on the performance and characteristics of Taiwan Stock Exchange listed family firms. It shows that the trend between 1997 and 2007 is for more firms to be widely held but that family firms retain their importance as a fraction of total asset. Family firms are found to be on average smaller, older and have a better return on equity than widely held firm. The better performance holds when controlling in a multivariate analysis for firm size, age and China investment.
    Family firm return on equity is not shown to present the curvilinearity of entrenchment – alignment – entrenchment associated in other studies with increasing levels of control. In a time series analysis from 1997 to 2007, there is no evidence that the better performance of family firms is a temporal effect. The ROA and ROE of family firms is better when controlling for year, asset and debt/asset.


    INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………1
    TAIWAN FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS…………………………………………4
    TAIWAN FAMILY FIRMS…………………………………………………………10
    RESEARCH METHOD ………………………………………………………………12
    DATA DESCRIPTION ……………………………………………………………12
    PRESENCE OF FAMILY FIRMS AND EVOLUTION …………………………13
    FAMILY FIRM CHARACTERISTICS……………………………………………18
    CROSS-SECTIONAL MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS……………………………23
    TEMPORAL EFFECT ANALYSIS………………………………………………26
    CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………………30
    BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………33

    List of Tables
    TABLE 1: S. CLAESSENS ET AL. (2000) CORRELATION BETWEEN AGE AND THE SIZE OF CONTROL STAKES IN EAST ASIAN CORPORATIONS………………………………………………5
    TABLE 2: S. CLAESSENS ET AL. (2000), CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL AND COMPANY SIZE…………………………………………………………………………………………………………6
    TABLE 3: CLAESSENS ET AL. (2000), HOW CONCENTRATED IS FAMILY CONTROL? …………………………………………………………………………………………………9
    TABLE 4: PRESENCE OF FAMILY FIRMS IN TSE LISTED COMPANIES…………………………14
    TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE FAMILY OWNERSHIP IN FIRMS PRESENT FROM 1997 TO 2007……17
    TABLE 6: CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY FIRMS USING 10% CONTROL AS CUT-OFF………19
    TABLE 7: CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY FIRMS USING 20% CONTROL AS CUT-OFF………22
    TABLE 8: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF ROE……………………………………………………24
    TABLE 9: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF OTHER PERFORMANCE INDICATORS…………24
    TABLE 10: ROE AND ROA TIME PANELS REGRESSION WITH 10% CUT-OFF FOR FAMILY FIRMS………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
    TABLE 11: ROE AND ROA TIME PANELS REGRESSION WITH 20% CUT-OFF FOR FAMILY FIRMS………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
    FIGURE 1: YEH ET AL. (2003), EXAMPLE OF JITUAN QIYE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE…………7
    FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF FAMILY FIRMS AMONG TSE LISTED FIRMS……………………17

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    SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=590305

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    SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=369620

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    Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. “Expropriation of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia.” World Bank, Working paper no. 2088 (1999).
    SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=620647

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