隨著全球資產管理規模大幅成長，機構投資人逐漸取代個人投資者成為市場主導力量，機構投資人不再僅是單純的投資者，更被賦予了透過股權行使以落實監督管理之責任。綜觀過往相關文獻多以財務績效指標或現金股利政策衡量公司治理品質，然此類指標主要反映企業之財務結果，較難全面捕捉公司治理之制度設計與實際執行績效。有鑑於此，本研究採用台灣證券交易所公司治理評鑑結果作為代理變數，涵蓋股東權益保護、董事會結構與運作、資訊透明度及永續發展等多元構面，以期能更全面地捕捉企業治理之績效表現。並進一步依據機構投資人與被投資公司之利益關聯程度及獨立性，將其區分為主動型與被動型兩類，分別評估其對公司治理評鑑績效之影響。實證結果顯示，主動型與被動型機構投資人持股比例皆對公司治理評鑑結果具有顯著正向影響。主動型機構投資人之長期截面治理效果顯著為正，反映其因具備較高獨立性與監督動機，長期持股產生累積性之正向影響；被動型機構投資人持股比例在固定效果模型中之係數則稍高於主動型，推論係因被動型機構投資人持股規模龐大且結構穩定，透過市場機制與資訊揭露要求形成持續性之結構性治理壓力所致。就兩類機構投資人治理效果之差異而言，相關假說僅獲部分支持，兩類機構投資人之治理效果差異因模型設定而有所不同，顯示機構投資人異質性之影響較理論預期更為複雜。

As global assets under management have expanded substantially, institutional investors have progressively displaced individual investors as the dominant force in capital markets. Institutional investors are no longer regarded merely as passive capital allocators; they are increasingly expected to fulfill an active stewardship role by exercising shareholder rights to monitor and discipline corporate management. While prior literature has predominantly relied on financial performance indicators, or dividend policy as proxies for corporate governance quality, such measures largely capture financial outcomes and fall short of reflecting the institutional design and actual implementation of governance mechanisms. To address this limitation, the present study employs the TWSE Corporate Governance Evaluation results as the proxy for governance quality. This evaluation encompasses multiple dimensions, including the protection of shareholder rights, board structure and functioning, information transparency, and sustainable development, thereby offering a more comprehensive assessment of corporate governance. Furthermore, this study classifies institutional investors into two categories based on their degree of independence and the extent of business ties with investee companies, and examines the differential effects of each type on corporate governance evaluation performance. The empirical results indicate that both active and passive institutional ownership exert a significantly positive effect on corporate governance evaluation outcomes. The positive long-run cross-sectional governance effect of active institutional investors is statistically significant, reflecting the cumulative influence of their sustained engagement, which is attributable to their greater independence and stronger monitoring incentives. In contrast, the coefficient for passive institutional ownership in the fixed-effects model is marginally higher than that for active institutional ownership, a finding that may be explained by the large and structurally stable holdings of passive institutional investors, which generate persistent governance pressure through market mechanisms and mandatory disclosure requirements. With respect to the differential governance effects between the two investor types, the relevant hypothesis receives only partial empirical support. The direction and magnitude of the estimated differences vary across model specifications, suggesting that the governance implications of institutional investor heterogeneity are more nuanced than theoretical predictions would anticipate.

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