本研究主要目的有三個；一是從理論上探討負債及股利的訊號放射；二是修正Ravid & Sarig (1991)的模式，加入代理成本的探討；三是以國內上市公司為樣本，驗證Ravid & Sarig(1991)修正後的模式，瞭解負債及股利當成訊號放射的意義。

根據模式推導及四個命題發展，本研究從三個方向著手進行實證。一是現金流量的觀點，二是稅負的觀點，三是代理成本的觀點。共計發展了十五項假說。

研究對象以台灣證券交易所上市公司，從民國77年到民國80年皆存在的上市公司為樣本，共計4年，123家上市公司。並取其公開資料為來源。

實證結果發現，資訊品質較佳的公司，由於現金流量較充足，負債償還會較多，所以同時負債比率會較低。但資訊品質較佳的公司，股利支付率並沒有明顯的增加，反而是現金流量比率變動愈大，股利支付率的變動會愈大。但在去除三個股利支付率極端值後，資訊品質較佳的公司，股利支付率顯著的增加。

不管有無股利支付，負債都是一個訊號。也由於市場存在資訊不對稱，所以用股利支付，可以作為另一個訊號，提供更多的訊息。由樣本公司的分析中得知，有股利支付的公司，現金流量比率比較多，沒有股利支付的公司，現金流量比率比較少。且有股利支付的公司，負債比率相對較無股利支付公司為低。股利支付的決策似乎要考慮的因素較多。

公司所得稅稅率增加，稅負利益增加，現金流量也會增加，可以有較多的償付負債的能力，所以負債比率會較低。但公司所得　稅稅率的變動，並不能支持股利支付率也會增加。且由於公司所得稅稅率和負債比率，股利支付率的解釋能力都很低。因此，在實務決策上可能並不是主要的決策依據。再者，不管有無去除三個股利支付率極端值，研究結果並無改變。

其次，負債比率和公司特性的關係，大抵都獲得支持。獲利能力愈好，負債比率就愈低。內部人士所有權比率愈集中，負債比率就愈低。公司規模愈大，負債比率就愈高。成長機會愈大，事業風險的變動，並沒有明顯的與負債有線性相關。股利支付率和各公司特性都沒有明顯的相關。一方面可以看出股利決策的複雜程度，一方面可能也受到其他因素的影響。但在去除三個股利支付率極端值後，股利支付率和獲利能力的關係獲得支持，表示獲利能力增加，股利支付率就會增加。

整體看來，修正後的Ravid & Sarig模式，基本上是獲得支持的。舉債和股利政策，會使股東期未財富受到稅負利益，破產成本或財務危機成本，及代理成本的抵換影響，因此，舉債和股利政策可以當成訊號，來傳遞公司未來的投資機會或盈餘預期。透過負債比率及股利支付率的訊號，外部人士可以用來推測公司的可支配現金流量及財務決策。因此，負債和股利政策的財務組合，具有訊號放射的價值，可以傳遞公司資訊品質。

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