東南亞湄公河次區域的電信網路詐欺、網路賭博與洗錢等跨境犯罪近年迅速擴張，不僅衝擊地主國治安，更牽動中國大陸的資金安全與社會穩定。面對此一非傳統安全威脅，中國大陸由良性忽視轉向強勢介入，藉由全球安全倡議、瀾湄合作機制及遣返、引渡要求，將打擊犯罪延伸為帶有長臂管轄色彩的域外治理。然而在相近的地緣結構與執法壓力下，泰國與柬埔寨卻呈現迥異的回應模式。本研究以此分歧為核心，採層次分析途徑，結合文獻分析法與案例研究法，選取背景相似的泰國和柬埔寨為比較案例，觀察期間自2019年至2026年初。
研究發現，中共域外治理已由不干涉演進為以打擊犯罪為切入點的主動介入，並透過規範話語、次區域機制與在地執法三層結構推進；其邏輯顯示大國的忽視並非恆定，而取決於議題是否反噬其國內穩定，據此補充不對稱關係理論，提出大國非忽視之命題。在回應上，柬埔寨因債務集中、政權存續依賴中方且問題難以轉嫁，傾向以管轄權讓渡換取政權庇護，趨近依附端；泰國則憑藉多元連結、自主安全機構與多邊管道，將合作限縮於司法與行政程序，趨近協商端。兩國分流主要由債務來源集中度、政權存續邏輯與問題可轉嫁性所形塑，依附深淺取決於資金來源結構而非債務總量，且高度配合未必帶來高治理韌性。最後，本研究歸納中小國家維繫協商空間的四項制度條件：債權與外資來源多元化、安全機構制度自主、問題責任可轉嫁，以及多邊管道可運作性，俾為承受強權域外治理壓力的東南亞國家提供政策參考。

In recent years, cross-border crimes such as telecom and cyber fraud, online gambling, and money laundering have expanded rapidly across the Mekong Subregion of Southeast Asia, undermining not only the public security of host states but also the financial security and social stability of mainland China. Confronting this non-traditional security threat, mainland China has shifted from benign neglect to assertive intervention, drawing on the Global Security Initiative, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism, and demands for repatriation and extradition to extend its campaign against crime into a form of extraterritorial governance that bears the character of long-arm jurisdiction. Under comparable geopolitical structures and enforcement pressures, however, Thailand and Cambodia have exhibited markedly different patterns of response. Taking this divergence as its central concern, this study adopts a level-of-analysis approach, combines documentary analysis with the case study method, and selects Thailand and Cambodia, two states with similar background conditions, as comparative cases, with an observation period extending from 2019 to early 2026.

The study finds that the CCP's extraterritorial governance has evolved from non-interference into active intervention that takes the fight against crime as its point of entry, advanced through a three-tier structure of normative discourse, subregional mechanisms, and localized law enforcement. Its underlying logic indicates that a major power's neglect is not constant but depends on whether an issue rebounds upon its own domestic stability. On this basis, the study supplements asymmetry theory by advancing the proposition of major-power non-neglect. With regard to responses, Cambodia, given its concentrated debt, the dependence of regime survival on Beijing, and the difficulty of transferring the problem elsewhere, has tended to trade the cession of jurisdiction for regime protection, moving toward the dependency end of the spectrum. Thailand, by contrast, has drawn on diversified linkages, institutionally autonomous security agencies, and multilateral channels to confine cooperation within judicial and administrative procedures, moving toward the negotiation end. The divergence between the two is shaped principally by the concentration of debt sources, the logic of regime survival, and the transferability of the problem; the depth of dependency is determined by the structure of funding sources rather than by the aggregate volume of debt, and a high degree of compliance does not necessarily yield high governance resilience. Finally, the study identifies four institutional conditions through which small and medium-sized states may sustain room for negotiation: diversification of creditors and sources of foreign capital, institutional autonomy of security agencies, transferability of responsibility for the problem, and the operability of multilateral channels, thereby offering policy reference for Southeast Asian states subject to the pressures of great-power extraterritorial governance.

一、中文部分
（一）專書
丘宏達著，陳純一修訂，2024。《現代國際法（修訂五版）》。臺北：三民書局。
朱浤源，2005。《撰寫碩博士論文實戰手冊》。臺北：正中書局。
張芳全，2021。《論文就是要這樣寫（5版）》。新北：心理出版社。
葉至誠、葉立誠，2011。《研究方法與論文寫作（3版）》。新北：商鼎文化。
（二）專書譯著
Franceschini, Ivan、Ling Li、Mark Bo 著，鍾榕芳譯，2025。《東南亞詐騙園區內幕》(Scam: Inside Southeast Asia’s Cybercrime Compounds)。臺北：大是文化。
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. & David A. Welch 著，張小明譯，2019。《哈佛最熱門的國際關係課》(Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History)。臺北：商業周刊。
（三）期刊論文
李志斐，2021/2。〈瀾湄合作中的非傳統安全治理：從碎片化到平臺化〉，《國際安全研究》，第39卷第1期，頁91-115。
宋學文，2008/12。〈層次分析對國際關係研究的重要性及模型建構〉，《問題與研究》，第47卷第4期，頁167-199。
胡敏遠，2025/6。〈中共與柬埔寨共建「德崇扶南運河」之圖謀〉，《海軍學術雙月刊》，第59卷第3期，頁6-22。
陳佩修，2009/8。〈泰國的軍事政變與政治變遷〉，《東吳政治學報》，第27卷第3期，頁65-116。
曾偉峯，2019/9。〈柬埔寨禁止線上賭博與中柬關係〉，《國防安全週報》，第66期，頁21-24。
黃瓊萩，2016/3。〈從權力不對稱結構的視角分析南海主權爭議發展的條件與因素〉，《展望與探索月刊》，第14卷第3期，頁100-115。
盧業中，2002/3。〈論國際關係理論之新自由制度主義〉，《問題與研究》，第41卷第2期，頁43-66。
謝立功，2004/12。〈兩岸跨境犯罪及其對策〉，《刑事政策與犯罪研究論文集》，第7期，頁165-186。
（四）學位論文
莊雨千，2018。《失靈的華人身分：泰國政治與外交中「非認同」研究》。臺北：國立臺灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。
（五）官方文件
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中華人民共和國外交部，2011/12/10。〈中老緬泰湄公河聯合巡邏執法正式啟動〉，《中華人民共和國外交部》，<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/201112/t20111210_693006.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/05/28。
中華人民共和國外交部，2016/3/23。〈瀾滄江—湄公河合作首次領導人會議三亞宣言〉，《中華人民共和國外交部》，<https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/zyxw/201603/t20160323_336913.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
中華人民共和國外交部，2023/2/21。〈全球安全倡議概念文件〉，《中華人民共和國外交部》，<https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202302/t20230221_11028322.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/06/19。
中華人民共和國外交部，2025/4/17。〈習近平同柬埔寨首相洪瑪奈舉行會談〉，《中華人民共和國外交部》，<https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202504/t20250417_11596342.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/06/01。
中華人民共和國外交部，2025/4/18。〈中華人民共和國和柬埔寨王國關於構建新時代全天候中柬命運共同體、落實三大全球倡議的聯合聲明〉，《中華人民共和國外交部》，<https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202504/t20250418_11596815.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/05/01。
國家發展改革委、外交部、商務部，2015/3/28。〈推動共建絲綢之路經濟帶和21世紀海上絲綢之路的願景與行動〉，《新華網》，<http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-03/28/c_1114793986.htm>，檢索時間：2026/05/11。
雲南省公安廳，2017/12/28。〈瀾滄江—湄公河綜合執法安全合作中心啟動〉，《雲南省人民政府》，<https://gonganting.yn.gov.cn/mPages_2410_669356.aspx>，檢索時間：2026/06/01。
聯合國，2000/11/15。〈聯合國打擊跨國有組織犯罪公約〉(United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime)，第55/25號決議，《聯合國大會》，<https://www.un.org/zh/documents/treaty/A-RES-55-25>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
（六）網際網路
人民公安報，2016/12/26。〈中老緬泰湄公河流域執法安全合作五週年綜述〉，《新華網》，<https://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-12/26/c_1120191881.htm>，檢索時間：2026/05/11。。
王亞秋，2019/7/31。〈中國企業正在改變柬埔寨，也毫無意外掀起「反中情緒」〉，《關鍵評論網》，<https://www.thenewslens.com/article/122790>，檢索時間：2026/06/20。
王爽，2024/7/29。〈泰國近60萬起網路犯罪案，女性受害者占比超六成！〉，《泰國頭條新聞》，<https://www.thaiheadlines.com/154660/>，檢索時間：2026/06/01。
毛鵬飛，2019/9/28。〈中柬執法合作協調辦公室在金邊正式成立〉，《新華網》，<https://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-09/28/c_1125052518.htm>。
台泰時報，2025/11/23。〈公債逼近上限 泰中期財政框架示警風險升溫〉，《台泰時報》，<https://taithaitimes.com/article/detail/4752>，檢索時間：2026/05/01。
弗林，2025/2/27。〈泰國副總理證實40名維吾爾族人遣返回中國 遣返在黎明前進行〉，《法國國際廣播電台中文網》，<https://rfi.my/BRxg>，檢索時間：2026/06/20。
沙蒙，2026/3/16。〈中國援助警用設備支持柬埔寨打擊電詐 雙方承諾讓電詐在柬埔寨無所遁形〉，《柬中時報》，<https://cc-times.com/posts/31513>，檢索時間：2026/06/19。
那利，2025/12/27。〈快訊！柬泰簽署落實停火聯合聲明 今日12時起正式停火〉，《柬中時報》，<https://cc-times.com/posts/30806>，檢索時間：2026/05/01。
那利，2026/4/6。〈柬埔寨「反電信網路詐欺法」正式生效 組織電詐最高可判終身監禁〉，《柬中時報》，<https://cc-times.com/posts/31750>，檢索時間：2026/06/18。
李宗憲，2025/11/12。〈引渡緬甸KK園區主謀佘智江 於曼谷機場移交中國警方〉，《中央通訊社》，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202511120266.aspx>，檢索時間：2026/06/18。
邢斯馨、劉亮，2026/1/8。〈公安部：重大跨境賭詐犯罪集團頭目陳志被從柬埔寨押解回國〉，《央視網》，<https://big5.cctv.com/gate/big5/news.cctv.cn/2026/01/08/ARTIhaRoGcH2RnUgaVeJfW1n260108.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
林楓，2026/3/27。〈國會聽證：跨國詐騙產業重創美國民眾，中國犯罪網絡與東南亞詐騙園區為美方打擊重點〉，《美國之音》，<https://www.voachinese.com/a/congressional-hearing-exposes-rising-global-scam-economy-20260326/8131235.html>，檢索時間：2026/05/28。
柬華日報，2022/11/30。〈蘇慶副總理獲授中國公安部金質「長城紀念章」〉，《柬華日報》，<https://www.jianhuadaily.com/20221130/181596>，檢索時間：2026/05/11。
唐緣媛，2024/1/9。〈「恐怖平衡」 中國在緬北衝突中面臨兩難〉，《自由亞洲電台》，<https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/junshiwaijiao/tj-01092024145916.html>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
高照芬，2023/11/14。〈傳讓中國公安上街巡邏，泰國總理澄清是共享資訊〉，《中央通訊社》，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202311140231.aspx>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
徐子軒，2019/5/6。〈新泰國的舊政治（上）：玩不贏軍政府的「民主對決」〉，《轉角國際》，<https://global.udn.com/global_vision/story/8663/3795750>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
習近平，2015/9/29。〈攜手構建合作共贏新夥伴 同心打造人類命運共同體—第七十屆聯合國大會一般性辯論講話〉，《新華網》，<http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/29/c_1116703645.htm>，檢索時間：2026/06/18。
習近平，2022/4/21。〈攜手迎接挑戰，合作開創未來〉，《人民日報》，<http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2022/0422/c1024-32405432.html>，檢索時間：2026/05/11。
傅攀峰，2022/10/19。〈中國法域外適用的立法現狀及其完善〉，《法治藍皮書：中國法治發展報告》，第22卷，《中國社會科學網》，<http://iolaw.cssn.cn/zxzp/202210/t20221019_5550387.shtml>，檢索時間：2026/05/27。
陸積明，2026/4/6。〈2025年柬埔寨新簽外債逾12億美元 年減31%〉，《柬中時報》，<https://cc-times.com/posts/31738>，檢索時間：2026/05/11。
無國界記者（RSF），2025。〈2025世界新聞自由指數〉，《無國界記者》，<https://rsf.org/zh-hant/classement?year=2025>，檢索時間：2026/06/18。
報導者、OCCRP、Voice of Democracy、Rappler，2026/1/25。〈台灣背景的柬埔寨房產集團利鑫，如何與線上博弈和詐騙交織？〉，《報導者》，<https://www.twreporter.org/a/the-phantom-investor-hsu-ming-chin-2>，檢索時間：2026/05/28。
熊豐、朱國亮，2025/11/13。〈「亞太新城」犯罪集團主犯佘智江被從泰國引渡回國〉，《人民網》，<http://sc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n2/2025/1113/c345460-41410245.html>，檢索時間：2026/06/01。
鄔春陽、安玲、趙容，2024/9/10。〈全球公共安全合作論壇（連雲港）2024年大會成果文件發布〉，《人民公安報》，<https://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254098/n4904352/c9733235/content.html>，檢索時間：2026/06/20。
鄧紀璇，2022/1/26。〈中國在網絡安全領域構建長臂管轄機制之思考〉，《互聯網天地》，2021年第12期，《安全內參》，<https://www.secrss.com/articles/38703>，檢索時間：2026/05/11。
鄭明達，2023/9/15。〈習近平會見柬埔寨首相洪瑪奈〉，《新華網》，<https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-09/15/c_1129864621.htm>，檢索時間：2026/06/19。

二、英文部分
（一）專書
Amerhauser, Kristina & Audrey Thill, 2025. Compound Crime: Cyber Scam Operations in Southeast Asia. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Ba, Alice D., 2009. (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Caballero-Anthony, Mely, 2005. Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Ciorciari, John D., 2010. The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Feldstein, Steven, 2021. The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Freedom House, 2025. Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025 Rule. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. Casinos, Cyber Fraud and Trafficking in Persons for Forced Criminality in Southeast Asia. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. Transnational Organized Crime and the Convergence of Cyber-Enabled Fraud, Underground Banking and Technological Innovation. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, 2020/4. Dealing with Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports (Global China Series). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
INTERPOL, 2024. Global Strategic Assessment 2024: Transnational Organized Crime. Lyon: INTERPOL General Secretariat.
Raymond, Gregory V., 2018. Thai Military Power: A Culture of Strategic Accommodation. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
Rolland, Nadège, 2017. China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research.
Strangio, Sebastian, 2020. In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Thorley, Martin, 2024. A Changing Landscape: China’s New Model of Global Governance and Its Impact on the Fight Against Organized Crime. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019. Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, Growth and Impact. Bangkok: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024. Casinos, Money Laundering, Underground Banking, and Transnational Organized Crime in East and Southeast Asia: A Hidden and Accelerating Threat. Bangkok: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024. Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, Routes and New Threats. Bangkok: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2025. Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia. Bangkok: UNODC.
United States Institute of Peace, 2024. Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: A Growing Threat to Global Peace and Security. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
Womack, Brantly, 2006. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Womack, Brantly, 2016. Asymmetry and International Relationships. New York: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank Group, 2025/2. Thailand Economic Monitor: Unleashing Sources of Growth—Innovation, SMEs and Startups. Washington, DC: World Bank.
（二）專書論文
Biba, Sebastian, 2021. “China’s Hydro-Hegemony in the Mekong Region: Room for Improvement,” in Jean-François Rousseau & Sabrina Habich-Sobiegalla, eds., The Political Economy of Hydropower in Southwest China and Beyond. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 215-234.
（三）期刊論文
Busbarat, Pongphisoot, 2016/8. “‘Bamboo Swirling in the Wind’: Thailand’s Foreign Policy Imbalance between China and the United States,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 233-257.
Busbarat, Pongphisoot, 2018/2. “Grabbing the Forgotten: China’s Leadership Consolidation in Mainland Southeast Asia through the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation,” ISEAS Perspective, No. 7, pp. 1-9.
Ciorciari, John D., 2015/5. “A Chinese Model for Patron-Client Relations? The Sino-Cambodian Partnership,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 245-278.
Fravel, M. Taylor, 2024/6. “China’s Global Security Initiative at Two: A Journey, Not a Destination,” China Leadership Monitor, Issue 80, pp. 1-17.
Goh, Evelyn, 2007/2008. “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 113-157.
Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, Erica Frantz & Joseph Wright, 2020/3-4. “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 103-115.
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee, 2008/8. “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 159-185.
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