經濟民族主義在美國有長久的歷史，主張國家積極干預以發展產業與技術，並透過關稅保護國內產業。當長期貿易逆差和產業衰退引發經濟和安全疑慮時，民眾的不滿會加劇政治壓力，導致經濟民族主義的思想興起，政府因而採行各項政策因應。美日貿易戰就是這種現象的範例。
2000年後，美國對中國貿易逆差超過4,000億美元，導致產業衰退和就業機會流失。中國日益增長的先進技術能力以及美國對中國供應鏈的高度依賴被視為國家安全的嚴重威脅。川普在301條款調查後，採取了加徵關稅、投資管制和出口限制等措施，對中國發動了雙邊貿易戰。拜登延續了與中國的對抗，但轉向為「小院高牆」策略，專注於嚴格控制關鍵技術，並透過多邊機制與盟友合作，同時強化國內產業的投資與發展。
儘管中國對美貿易順差略為降低，美國整體貿易逆差仍持續擴大。投資補助吸引了國內外資金和就業機會增加，產業復甦的程度有限。出口管制阻礙中國取得先進晶片與設備，中國仍持續推動產業與技術升級。貿易戰削弱了中國的出口和信心，同時略微增強了美國公眾的自信心和對貿易保護政策的支持。整體而言，貿易戰只能減緩而無法阻止中國半導體產業的進步。

Economic nationalism has a long history in the United States, advocating active state intervention to develop industry and technology and protecting domestic industries through tariffs. When chronic trade deficits and industrial decline raise economic and security concerns, public discontent intensifies political pressure, leading to the rise of economic nationalism and the government's policy responses. The US-Japan trade war is a prime example of this phenomenon.
After 2000, the US trade deficit with China exceeded $400 billion, leading to industrial decline and job losses. China's growing technological capabilities and the US's heavy reliance on Chinese supply chains were seen as serious threats to national security. Following the Section 301 investigation, Trump implemented tariffs, investment controls, and export restrictions, launching a bilateral trade war against China. Biden has continued the confrontation with China but shifted to a "Small Yard, High Fence" strategy, focusing on strict control of key technologies, collaborating with allies through multilateral mechanisms, and strengthening investment and development in domestic industries.
Although China’s trade surplus with the U.S. has declined slightly, the overall U.S. trade deficit keeps widening. Subsidies have boosted investment and jobs but achieved limited industrial recovery. Export controls restrict China’s access to advanced chips, yet it continues upgrading its technology. The trade war has weakened China’s exports and confidence while slightly strengthening U.S. support for protectionism. Overall, it only slows—rather than stops—China’s semiconductor progress.

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