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研究生: 蔡瀞萱
論文名稱: 兩岸公司治理與財務危機關聯性之研究
Corporate Governance and Financial Distress across the Taiwan Strait
指導教授: 許崇源
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 商學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accounting
論文出版年: 2008
畢業學年度: 96
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 110
中文關鍵詞: 公司財務危機股東行動主義
相關次數: 點閱:105下載:0
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  • 公司應當為誰所有?又應該為誰而治?巨型企業之存亡不僅僅關乎股東之利益,員工失業、上下游產業訂單減少、債權人呆帳無法收回等等,影響擴及整個社會經濟,使得各國學者無不致力於發展完善的公司治理制度。中國大陸政府於2001年開始,將公司治理列為國民經濟及社會發展之重要改革方向,然而實施多年來,卻始終因國有股一股獨大、一股獨尊而流於「徒有其形而無其神」之弊。本研究將站在公司治理的角度,加入股東行動主義變數,探討中國大陸企業發生財務危機之原因。
    本文以被特殊處理及企業信用風險評等較差之上市公司分別作為中國大陸及臺灣模型建構之依變數,探討流通股比率、董監持股比率、獨立董事規模、董監事及高階經理人報酬、年度股東大會出席人數、年度股東大會出席股份率,作為分析中國大陸公司治理特性與企業失敗之關聯性研究;此外監察人內部化、董監持股比率、董監持股質押比率、獨立董事規模、董監事報酬及總經理與財務主管異動次數,則作為研究臺灣公司治理特性與企業財務危機之關係性分析。
    本研究發現,配對樣本之下,中國大陸公司治理變數之董監及高階管理人員酬勞佔稅前淨利、獨立董事規模、流通股比率、年度股東大會出席人數、股東大會出席比率,與企業失敗呈顯著負向關係;臺灣公司治理變數之董監持股比率、董監酬勞佔公司稅前淨利,與企業失敗呈顯著負向關係,董監事持股質押比率與公司財務危機呈顯著正相關。另外,非配對樣本之迴歸結果與配樣樣本差異不大,於中國大陸模型中,非配對樣本顯示,企業失敗與董監及高階管理人員酬勞佔稅無顯著關聯,然而與董監持股比率呈顯著負相關;於臺灣模型中,非配對樣本顯示,董監事酬勞佔稅前淨利比率與企業失敗無顯著關聯,然而財務主管之異動次數與企業失敗卻呈一般顯著之正相關,較配對樣本之顯著水準為高。

    關鍵字:公司治理、財務危機、股東行動主義


    第一章 緒論 1
    第一節 研究背景與動機 1
    第二節 研究目的與問題 4
    第三節 研究架構 5
    第二章 文獻探討 7
    第一節 公司治理之相關研究 7
    第二節 世界各國之公司治理結構之分析與探討 32
    第三節 公司治理與財務危機之關聯性研究 50
    第三章 研究方法 52
    第一節 研究對象之界定與樣本之選擇-大陸地區 52
    第二節 研究對象之界定與樣本之選擇-臺灣地區 60
    第三節 假說發展與研究變數-中國大陸 64
    第四節 假說發展與研究變數-臺灣 69
    第五節 研究方法 73
    第四章 實證結果與分析 80
    第一節 敘述性統計 80
    第二節 相關性分析 83
    第三節 共線性檢定 86
    第四節 平均數檢定 87
    第五節 LOGISTIC迴歸分析 89
    第六節 敏感性分析 94
    第五章 結論及建議 105
    第一節 研究結論 105
    第二節 研究限制 108
    第三節 研究建議 109

    表目錄
    表 2- 1 內部人導向與外部人導向公司治理機制之差異 37
    表 3- 1大陸危機公司之產業別 57
    表 3- 2大陸危機公司與正常公司配對 58
    表 3- 3臺灣危機公司之產業別 61
    表 3- 4臺灣危機公司與正常公司配對 62
    表 3- 5財務危機之定性分析模型 73
    表 4- 1敘述統計量-中國大陸 81
    表 4- 2敘述統計量-臺灣 82
    表 4- 3相關性分析-中國大陸 84
    表 4- 4相關性分析-臺灣 85
    表 4- 5 對數行列式-中國大陸 86
    表 4- 6 對數行列式-臺灣 86
    表 4- 7平均數檢定-中國大陸 87
    表 4- 8 平均數檢定-臺灣 88
    表 4- 9 OMNIBUS 檢定-中國大陸 89
    表 4- 10 OMNIBUS 檢定-臺灣 89
    表 4- 11 模式摘要-中國大陸 90
    表 4- 12 模式摘要-臺灣 90
    表 4- 13 分類表-中國大陸 91
    表 4- 14 分類表-臺灣 91
    表 4- 15 迴歸分析結果-中國大陸 92
    表 4- 16 迴歸分析結果-臺灣 92
    表 4- 17 敘述統計量-中國大陸 96
    表 4- 18 敘述統計量-臺灣 97
    表 4- 19 相關係數檢定-中國大陸 99
    表 4- 20 相關係數檢定-臺灣 100
    表 4- 21 對數行列式-中國大陸 101
    表 4- 22 對數行列式-臺灣 101
    表 4- 23 分類表-中國大陸 102
    表 4- 24 分類表-臺灣 102
    表 4- 25 迴歸分析結果-中國大陸 103
    表 4- 26 迴歸分析結果-臺灣 104

    圖目錄
    圖 1- 1 研究架構 6
    圖 2- 1 公司與利益相關者 14
    圖 3- 1 二分類檢定法 74

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