本研究探討CEO本地性對聯合貸款條件的影響。透過1992年至2019年美國聯合貸款資料及手動蒐集之CEO地緣資訊，研究結果顯示：由本地CEO領導的企業雖面臨較高的貸款利差，但在非價格條件方面（如貸款金額更大、期限更長、較少擔保要求）則享有更優惠的條件。這些結果與理論預測一致，即CEO的地理連結可能使貸款人擔憂其偏袒地方利益或傾向裙帶關係，進而要求更高的風險溢價；然而，本地CEO也可能因對企業所在地的熟悉與情感連結展現更高的信任與長期經營承諾，使得貸款人在其他契約保障上有所放寬。進一步分析發現，當CEO的激勵機制與股東利益高度一致時，本地CEO的貸款利差顯著下降。此結果顯示，在內部治理機制強健的情況下，本地CEO被貸款人視為更致力於提升公司長期價值，進而緩解代理問題，並改善整體貸款條件。

This study investigates the effect of CEO locality on syndicated loan contracting terms. Utilizing U.S. syndicated loan data and hand-collected CEO locality information from 1992 to 2019, I find that firms led by local CEOs are associated with higher loan spreads but more favorable non-pricing terms, including larger loan amounts, longer maturities, and a lower likelihood of requiring collateral. These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that while CEO geographic embeddedness may initially raise lender concerns about potential favoritism or parochial behavior—reflected in higher risk premiums—local CEOs can also foster stronger trust and long-term orientation, leading lenders to relax other contractual protections. Furthermore, I find that when CEO incentives are more closely aligned with shareholder interests, the loan spread for local CEOs decreases significantly. This suggests that local CEOs, when supported by strong internal governance mechanisms, are perceived by lenders as more committed to long-term firm value, thereby mitigating agency concerns and improving overall loan terms.

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