| 研究生: |
阮栢杰 Yuen Pak Kit, Tiger |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
道德現象學中動力意向的後設倫理學奠基——對馬克斯•舍勒的個案研究 The Meta-ethical grounding of Motivational Intentionality in Moral Phenomenology: a case study of Max Scheler |
| 指導教授: |
羅麗君
Lo, Lee-Chun |
| 口試委員: |
林建福
Lin, Chien-Fu 林遠澤 Lin, Yuan-Tse |
| 學位類別: |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱: |
文學院 - 哲學系 Department of Philosophy |
| 論文出版年: | 2025 |
| 畢業學年度: | 114 |
| 語文別: | 英文 |
| 論文頁數: | 208 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 道德動力 、道德現象學 、馬克思•舍勒 、後設倫理學奠基 、道德意向性 、跨學科研究 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Moral motivation, Moral phenomenology, Max Scheler, Meta-ethical grounding, Moral intentionality, Interdisciplinary studies |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:27 下載:3 |
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本文從提出主題問題:「為何我會道德地行動?」出發,析論道德現象學在處理道德動力及奠基之探問時,具有作為一門第三學科之獨立理論地位。就此,本文比較道德現象學、道德心理學和哲學倫理學的潛在貢獻和限制,並輔以各學科相關的策略性個案研究支持上述析論。在學科內的研究中,本文對道德現象學本性的學術討論和馬克思•舍勒的個案研究進行雙向研究。在跨學科的研究中,本文分析這三學科的辯證關係,並藉鑒它們各自的理論本性和實作進行析論。準確而言,本文圍繞三大主題和九個結構性核心問題展開,主導整體析論範疇。
研究成果上,本文推進了道德現象學的方法嚴謹性,並促動上述三學科間的理論協作。在現象學科內,本文提出了全面性、準確性和無偏倚之基礎,以及「現象學召喚」的引導功能。本文也析論其理論合法則性的各種知識上的辯護,特別建立了「批判讀者分析」之方法。橫跨學科間,本文透過前理論、理論和後理論層次論證其理論的獨立地位和協聯能力。此外,藉由對動力內、外在論之爭的結構性重構和理解,本文析述道德現象學在參與跨學科對話的貢獻。總之,本文表明:道德現象學的獨特貢獻在於為動機意向性之事實提供了盡可能嚴謹的說明;而其內在原則和現實的學科預期皆為達成此說明提供支持。
本文的研究貢獻在於加強對當代論述主流就道德探究的趨勢之調整。在現象學科內,本文從各角度追溯至胡塞爾嚴謹科學方法論兼配分析嚴格性,並隨後就此計劃進行了簡介演示。此文也提出一系列辯證性跨學科的定向重構,以應對目前主流的界限。更進一步,本文最終成為一項前期性提案,為驅進對道德動力和意向性探究的持續進展作準備工作。
本文的脈落邏輯分為三個階層,每層皆應對特定的探究類型。在其第一階層,本文旨在回答關於動力意向性的後設倫理學奠基之「是甚麼」的問題。為回答這一問題,本文建構第二階層。此階層由一「如何」問題以查探(跨)學科對「是甚麼」問題的研究方法;和一「為何」問題以分析學科上的證成、挑戰和協聯,從而加強對上述「如何」問題的查探。為了具體化這些研究,第三階階層涉及特定的理論個案研究,特別是對舍勒的析論,用以支持上述階層的論證。
This thesis argumentatively defends the distinctive theoretical position of moral phenomenology as a firmly established third discipline in addressing the inquiry into moral motivation and its grounding, originating from the thematic question of “Why would I act morally?” This is achieved by comparing the potential contributions and boundaries of moral phenomenology, moral psychology, and philosophical ethics, supported by relevant strategic case studies for each discipline. In terms of intradisciplinary study, the thesis conducts a two-way investigation between scholarly discussions on the nature of moral phenomenology and Max Scheler’s case studies. In terms of interdisciplinary study, it examines the dialectical relationship among the three disciplines, drawing upon comparisons of their respective theoretical natures and practices. Precisely, this thesis is organized around three major themes and nine structural key questions that drive the entire scope of this thesis.
As a result, this thesis advances the methodological rigor of moral phenomenology and facilitates theoretical accommodations across the three disciplines. Within phenomenology, the thesis proposes the foundations of comprehensiveness, accuracy, and impartiality, as well as the directive function of a “phenomenological calling.” It also articulates various epistemic defenses of its disciplinary legitimacy, particularly through the development of “critical reader analysis.” Across disciplines, this thesis argues for its independent status and associative capability through pre-theoretical, theoretical, and post-theoretical layers. Furthermore, it demonstrates the contribution of moral phenomenology to interdisciplinary dialogues, supported by a structurally redefined understanding of the debate between motivational internalism and externalism. All in all, this thesis demonstrates that the unique contribution of moral phenomenology lies in offering the most rigorous possible account of the facts of motivational intentionality, supported by internal principles and a realistic disciplinary expectation in achieving this.
The contribution of this thesis lies in reinforcing a contemporary redirection of mainstream discourse toward moral inquiry. Within phenomenology, the thesis traces back to Husserl’s scientific methodology with analytic rigor through various aspects, followed by a brief demonstration of such a project. This thesis also proposes a series of dialectical interdisciplinary re-orientations in response to current mainstream boundaries. Beyond this, the thesis ultimately serves as a preparatory proposal aimed at the sustainable progression of the ongoing pursuit of the inquiry of moral motivation and intentionality.
The logic of the context is structured across three levels, each corresponding to a specific type of inquiry. At the first level, this thesis aims to answer a “What” question regarding the metaethical grounding of motivational intentionality. To address this, the thesis develops a second level constituted by a “How” question, which investigates (inter-)disciplinary approaches to the subject of “What”; and a “Why” question, which analyzes the disciplinary justifications, challenges, and associations reinforcing the “How” investigation. In order to concretize these studies, the third level employs specific theoretical case studies, particularly that of Scheler, to support the arguments established at the upper levels.
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Section 1.1. Indication 1
Section 1.2. Definitions 4
Section 1.3. Themes and Chapter structure 9
Chapter 2. Moral Phenomenology on moral motivation and its meta-ethical grounding, a case study of Max Scheler 12
Section 2.1. The nature of moral phenomenology in addressing moral motivation 12
Section 2.2. The background of moral phenomenology: Antecedents of Scheler’s moral phenomenology—Hutcheson, Hume, and Husserl 17
Section 2.3. A case study of Max Scheler’s moral phenomenology 26
Subsection 2.3.1. The phenomenological framework of Max Scheler 27
Subsection 2.3.2. The phenomenological approach to moral reality 33
Subsection 2.3.3. The Meta-Ethical grounding of moral intention and motivation 37
Subsection 2.3.4. The Intentional Process of Moral Motivation 64
Subsection 2.3.5. The Experiential Aspect of Moral Recognition 72
Chapter 3. Moral phenomenology compared to moral psychology and philosophical ethics, in the context of moral motivation 78
Section 3.1. The unique position of moral phenomenology compared to moral psychology and philosophical ethics 78
Subsection 3.1.1. The fundamental approaches of moral psychology in addressing moral motivation 78
Subsection 3.1.2. The fundamental approaches of philosophical ethics in addressing moral motivation 91
Section 3.2. The relationship among the three disciplines and debates between Internalism and Externalism 102
Subsection 3.2.1. The relationship among the three disciplines 102
Subsection 3.2.2. Overcoming the potential boundaries of moral psychology and philosophical ethics 105
Subsection 3.2.3. Debates between Internalism and Externalism 108
Section 3.3. Some fundamental boundaries of moral phenomenology and possible solutions 119
Chapter 4. Criticisms of Max Scheler: a two way investigation and beyond 143
Section 4.1. Critical analyses and the two way investigation of Max Scheler 143
Subsection 4.1.1. Ethical issues 143
Subsection 4.1.2. Phenomenological issues 144
Subsection 4.1.3. The meta-ethical grounding structuring motivational intentionality 155
Subsection 4.1.4. The overall criticisms and possible resolutions 158
Section 4.2. An explorational remark of phenomenological reconsideration of ego 165
Subsection 4.2.1. Intention between free will and moral motivation: a phenomenological attempt 172
Subsection 4.2.2. Who is a moral philosopher and what does it mean to study moral philosophy 184
Chapter 5. Conclusion 190
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