本研究旨在探討單獨導入審計委員會制之治理結構變革，是否能提升盈餘品質。日本於2015年修訂《公司法》後，企業可選擇單獨成立審計委員會，而產生監察人會與審計委員會並存的情況。本研究以東京證券交易所之上市公司為研究對象，透過企業自結盈餘與會計師查核後盈餘之差異（即審計調整數）檢驗審計委員會對審計調整發生機率與幅度之影響。
實證結果顯示，設置審計委員會之企業，其發生審計調整的機率顯著較低，證實審計委員會能有效發揮門檻預防作用，從源頭降低會計師要求調整盈餘的可能性。然而，審計委員會對審計調整幅度卻未達統計顯著水準，顯示日本企業在公司治理轉型中可能存在內生性問題，即實務上有單獨設置審計委員會之企業，其本身往往已具備較佳之財務體質。這種「優等生自我選擇」才是決定審計調整幅度大小的核心關鍵，而非全然歸因於制度本身的後續治理功效。

This study examines whether the corporate governance reform of introducing a standalone audit committee effectively enhances earnings quality. Following Japan’s 2015 Companines Act amendments, firms were allowed to establish a standalone audit committee as an alternative to the traditional statutory auditor board. Using data from Tokyo Stock Exchange listed companies, this study analyzes the audit committee's impact on the probability and magnitude of audit adjustments—the discrepancy between preaudited and audited earnings.
Empirical results indicate that firms with an audit committee have a significantly lower probability of undergoing audit adjustments, suggesting a robust preventive role that reduces the need for auditor-initiated corrections. However, the committee's impact on the magnitude of adjustments is statistically insignificant. This finding reveals an endogeneity issue in corporate governance transition: firms choosing to adopt the audit committee system typically possess better financial health, operating performance, and internal controls beforehand. This "top-tier student self-selection effect" is the core driver of the adjustment magnitude, rather than the subsequent governance efficacy of the system itself.

吳宗穎，2021， 我國公司治理及內部監督制度之研究－以日本公司法為借鏡，國立政治大學法律學系碩士論文。
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. 2001. The effectiveness of blue ribbon recommendations in mitigating financial misstatements: an empirical study. Auditing Mid–year Conference. Houston, Texas.
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (1): 69–87.
Abegglen, J., and G. Stalk. 1985. Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Abrahamson, E. 1991. Managerial fads and fashions: the diffusion and rejection of innovations. Academy of Management Review 16 (3): 586–612.
Agrawal, A., and S. Chadha. 2005. Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal of Law and Economics 48 (2): 371–406.
Allen, J., M. Connors, and A. Krutikov. 2008. White paper on corporate governance in Japan. Asian Corporate Governance Association Publishing, Hong Kong.
Aman, H., and P. Nguyen. 2012. The size and composition of corporate boards in Japan. Asian Business & Management 11 (4): 425–444.
Aoki, M. 2001. Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Aoki, H. 2004. Boardroom reform in Japanese business: An analysis of the introduction of the executive officer system and its effects. Asian Business & Management 3 (2): 173–199.
Aoki, M., G. Jackson, and H. Miyajima. 2007. Corporate governance in Japan: institutional change and organizational diversity. Stanford, CA: Oxford University Press.
Bartov, E., F. A. Gul, and J. S. L. Tsui. 2000. Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (3): 421–452.
Beasley, M., J. Carcello, and D. Hermanson. 1999. Fraudulent financial reporting: 1987–1997. An analysis of U.S. public companies. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
Bonn, I., T. Yoshikawa, and P. Phan. 2004. Effects of board structure on firm performance: A comparison between Japan and Australia. Asian Business & Management 3 (1): 105–125.
Braun, K. 2001. The disposition of audit–detected misstatements: An examination of risk and reward factors and aggregation effects. Contemporary Accounting Research 18 (1): 71–99.
Chen, J., R. R. Duh, A. W. H. Hsu, and C. M. Pan. 2015. Can Anglo–Saxon audit committee scheme improve earnings quality in non–Anglo–Saxon environments? Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 11(1): 61–74.
Chen, S., Z. Li, and W. Chi. 2018. Client importance and audit quality: evidence from China. Asia–Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 25 (5): 624–638.
Cohen, J., G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2002. Corporate governance and the audit process. Contemporary Accounting Research 19 (4): 573–94.
Cohen, J., G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2007a. Corporate governance and the audit process in the post Sarbanes–Oxley era: Do auditors perceive substantive changes? Working paper, Boston College.
Cohen, J., G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2007b. Form versus substance: The implications for auditing practice and research of alternative perspectives on corporate governance. Working paper, Boston College.
Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2): 329–356.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1–36.
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1–2): 145–176.
DeZoort, F. T. 1998. An analysis of experience effects on audit committee members' oversight judgments. Accounting, Organizations and Society 23 (1): 1–21.
DeZoort, T. F., and S. E. Salterio. 2001. The effects of corporate governance experience and financial reporting and audit knowledge in audit committee members' judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 20 (2): 31–47.
DeZoort, F. T., D. R. Hermanson, and R. W. Houston. 2008. Audit committee member support for proposed audit adjustments: Pre–SOX versus post–SOX judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 27 (1): 85–104.
DiMaggio, P., and W. Powell. 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48 (2): 147–160.
Efendi, J., A. Srivastava, and E. P. Swanson. 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of Financial Economics 85 (3): 667–708.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 301–325.
Fogarty, J., and L. Kalbers. 1998. Organizational and economic explanations of audit committee oversight. Journal of Managerial Issues 10 (2): 129–150.
Gilson, R., and C. Milhaupt. 2004. Choice as regulatory reform: The case of Japanese corporate governance. Working Paper, Columbia University.
Hashimoto, M. 2002. Commercial code revisions: promoting the evolution of Japanese companies. Working paper, Nomura Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan.
Hatfield, R. C., C. Agoglia, and M. H. Sanchez. 2008. Client characteristics and the negotiation tactics of auditors: Implications for financial reporting. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (5): 1183–1207.
Jackson, G., and A. Moerke. 2005. Continuity and change in corporate governance: Comparing Germany and Japan. Corporate Governance 13 (3): 351–361.
Keune, M. B., and K. M. Johnstone. 2012. Materiality judgments and the resolution of detected misstatements: The role of managers, auditors, and audit committees. The Accounting Review 87 (5): 1641–1677.
Kinney, W. R., Jr., and R. D. Martin. 1994. Does auditing reduce bias in financial reporting? A review of audit–related adjustment studies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 13 (1): 149–156.
Kaplan, S., and B. Minton. 1994. Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics 36 (2): 510–546.
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 375–400.
Kubo, K. 2005. Executive compensation policy and company performance in Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 13 (3): 429–436.
Lennox, C., X. Wu, and T. Zhang. 2014. Does mandatory rotation of audit partners improve audit quality? The Accounting Review 89 (5): 1775–1803.
Lennox, C., X. Wu, and T. Zhang. 2016. The effect of audit adjustments on earnings quality: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 61 (2–3): 545–562.
Lennox, C. S., Z. T. Wang, and X. Wu. 2018. Earnings management, audit adjustments, and the financing of corporate acquisitions: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 65 (1): 21-40.
McDaniel, L., R. D. Martin, and L. A. Maines. 2002. The Accounting Review 77 (s-1): 139–167.
McMullen, D. A. 1996. Audit committee performance: An investigation of the consequences associated with audit committees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 15 (Spring): 87–103.
Nakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369–387.
Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2002. Evidence from auditors about managers' and auditors' earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review 77 (s-1): 175–202.
Peasnell, K., P. Pope, and S. Young. 2005. Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 32 (7-8): 1311–1346.
Sanders, W. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055–1078.
Sarra, J., and M. Nakahigashi. 2002. Balancing social and corporate culture in the global economy: The evolution of Japanese corporate structure and norms. Law & Policy 24 (4): 299–354.
Tanaka, W. 2026. Current state and analysis of corporate governance reforms in Japan: How the “comply or explain” rule can and has changed the board of directors system. In The evolution of corporate governance in Japan, edited by H. Miyajima and Y. Arikawa. United Kingdom: Routledge: 81–97.
Wailerdsak, N., and A. Suehiro. 2004. Top executive origins: A comparative study between Japan and Thailand. Asian Business & Management 3 (1): 85–104.
Wolnizer, P. W. 1995. Are audit committees red herrings? Abacus 31 (1): 45–66.
Wright, A., and S. Wright. 1997. An examination of factors affecting the decision to waive audit adjustments. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 12 (1): 15–36.
Yoshikawa, T., and P. H. Phan. 2003. The performance implications of ownership–driven governance reform. European Management Journal 21 (6): 698–706.
Yoshikawa, T., and J. McGuire. 2008. Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 25 (1): 5–24.
Zahra, S., and J. Pearce. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management 15 (2): 291–334.