期後事項係指企業於財務報導期間結束日後至查核報告日間所發生之事項。雖然此類事項發生於會計年度結束後，表面上屬於事後資訊，惟其發生時間仍早於股東大會召開時間，故可能影響股東對管理階層之評價。本研究以日本上市公司為樣本，利用日本強制修正盈餘預測制度，探討盈餘預測修正之時點及方向是否會反映於股東議案贊成率。
實證結果顯示，單純是否於期後修正盈餘預測，對股東議案贊成率未呈顯著影響；相較之下，盈餘預測修正方向具有較明確之解釋力。企業向下修正盈餘預測時，股東議案贊成率下降；企業向上修正盈餘預測時，股東議案贊成率提高。追加測試顯示，新冠疫情後股東對盈餘預測修正方向之反應較為明確，樣本配對結果亦與主要分析大致一致。整體而言，本研究發現，股東對管理階層選任議案之支持程度，主要與盈餘預測修正之方向有關，而非是否於期後修正。

Events after the reporting period are those that occur between the end of the financial reporting period and the day of the audit report. Although these kinds of events occur after the fiscal year, they belong to the afterword information. They are still announced before the shareholders’ meeting, which can affect the management's valuation by the shareholders. This study takes the listed companies in Japan as samples, examining whether the timing and direction of earnings forecast revisions will reflect on the shareholders’ approval rate under the mandatory earnings forecast revision system.
The empirical results show that merely earnings forecast revisions after the fiscal year don’t affect the shareholders’ approval rate. In contrast, the direction of earnings forecast revisions has much specific explanatory power. When enterprises revise the earnings forecasts downward, it reduces shareholders’ approval rate. When enterprises revise the earnings forecasts upward, it increases shareholders’ approval rate. Additional tests show that shareholders’ responses to the direction of earnings forecast revisions become more evident after the COVID-19 pandemic, and the matching sample results are consistent with the main analysis. Overall, this study finds that shareholder support for management election proposals is mainly associated with the direction of earnings forecast revisions, rather than the revisions after the fiscal year.

潘健民、黃郁茜，2021。企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯：以強制管理階層盈餘預測修正為例，會計審計論叢，第11卷第2期，頁43-83。
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