本論文以「尋租理論」來分析，當前中國大陸農村中滋生蔓延之農村幹部的尋租性腐敗行為。研究目的在於：制度轉變和制度設計如何影響個人的行為，以及由此所造成的社會損失和代價。

在1978年中國大陸農村實行承包制以後，農民收入快速增長，基本上解決了溫飽問題。然而，一些地方行政單位，以「農民已經富起來」為理由，紛紛向農民要求「贊助」，亂收費、亂罰款亂集資和各種亂攤派的現象開始出現，而且日益嚴重。因此，自九○年代開始中共當局發佈了一系列禁止攤派與減少農民負擔的政策，但效果不彰。本論文重點，即，針對此一現象尋求解釋，探討農村地區盛行的攤派問題。

本文研究時間範圍是從改革開放後（1978年）到2000年為止；研究對象主要是農村幹部。所謂的農村幹部，是以村民委員會，以及鄉鎮基層的幹部和村的黨支部書記為主。第二章探討「尋租理論」。第三章討論中共中央的政策，以及農村幹部對農民的尋租行為。第四章分析農村幹部損害農民利益的具體方式和原因。第五章探究攤派所產生的政治、經濟和社會的影響。最後，提出本文結論。

綜合上述的分析，中國大陸在改革開放之後，農民收入雖然增加，但農村地區農民負擔問題仍相當嚴重。其主要原因在於中共對農民政策偏差、監督機制不健全、共產幹部濫權與腐敗所致。

Based on the rent-seeking theory, this thesis is an analysis of local cadre's corruption that has been rampant in many Chines rural communities. The purpose of this study is to examine how social reform and social planning can affect a person's behavior, and possibly incur social cost.

After the Chinese government implemented the Production Responsibility System in 1978, the income of Chinese peasants has increased quickly and many of the peasants became independent tillers. As the peasants grew richer, local officials began to extract more from the villages. Excessive taxes, fees, penalties and illegally raised money from the peasants (Tan Pai) have all become serious problems in China's rural areas. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government announced a series of policies that prohibit Tan Pai. Whether these policies did reduce the peasants' burden, however, is not clear yet.

This thesis examines the Tan Pai problem and the incentives and behaviors of local cadres during the period of 1978-2000. Local cadres include village chiefs as well as the Communist Party leaders in villages and towns. Chapter I is the introduction. Chapter 2 is a presentation of the rent-seeking theory. Chapter 3 is a discussion the policies of the Chinese central government and local cadre's rent seeking behavior. Chapter 4 is an analysis of concrete examples of how local cadres' behavior hurt peasants' interests. Chapter 5 is a study of the Tan Pai problem and its social, political and economic consequences. Chpater 6 is the conclusion.

The major finding of this study is that despite of the central government's policies, Chinese peasants' burden has not been reduced mainly because there has not been any monitoring system to effectively discipline local cadres' rent-seeking behavior.