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| 研究生： |
王惠屏 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
框架與逃漏稅--展望理論在教師課稅問題之研究 |
| 指導教授： | 吳家恩 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
社會科學學院 - 財政學系 Department of Public Finance |
| 論文出版年： | 2004 |
| 畢業學年度： | 92 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 70 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 框架 、展望理論 、逃漏稅 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：135 下載：119 |
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目前台灣的所得稅法規定中小學以下的教師薪資所得免稅，政府為了達到量能課稅之公平原則，於是研擬提出教師取消免稅與加薪同步，即收多少稅就加多少薪資的策略，以讓教師在課稅前後的實質所得不變，藉以減少教師人員的反彈。本文的目的在於探討對中小學以下教師課稅又加薪的框架限制下，即政府在維持對教師課稅前後的教師淨所得不變，分析是否會讓中小學以下教師有逃漏稅的誘因，而使政府補貼教師薪資的美意喪失，而導致政府及全民的損失。因為政府要以加薪來彌補教師因課稅後所短少的所得，以順利進行取消免稅優惠措施之前，必須還要考量課稅又加薪後是否會因此而使財政收入不增反減。
本文研究發現，在預期效用理論下，若教師在舊制度的淨所得的效用滿足小於新制度逃漏稅的預期效用，則加薪又課稅的新制度實施下，教師就會因此而產生逃漏稅行為。此時，政府可藉由提高罰款倍率或查核率，以讓教師的逃漏稅減少。而在展望理論下，政府除了可藉由提高查核率外，還可使用提高扣繳金額的手段來減少教師逃漏稅的誘因；再者，政府若將處罰標的改為逃漏所得額，會比處罰標的為逃漏稅額更易減少教師逃漏稅的誘因；此外，扣除額的增加也會增加教師的依從。因此，本文認為政府在維持收支平衡下，想要以加薪來取消教師免稅的理想可能將無法達成，而且會造成比政策實施前更嚴重的稅收損失現象。更進一步地分析，除非，政府有能力在實施提高扣繳率、查核率或扣除額的補救措施的情況下，能確保不引起人民情緒上的反彈，如此才能有效降低教師的逃漏稅意願，否則，政府對於課稅又加薪的政策應再做評估。
第1章緒論...................................................1
1.1研究動機 .............................................1
1.2研究目的 ..............................................2
1.3研究方法 ..............................................3
1.4本文架構 ..............................................4
第2章文獻回顧 ..............................................6
2.1逃漏稅理論相關文獻 ....................................7
2.1.1 預期(Expected)效用理論相關文獻 ...................7
2.1.2 展望(Prospect)理論相關文獻 .......................9
2.2逃漏稅實驗與實證相關文獻 .............................11
2.2.1 未含框架效果下的實驗和實證文獻 ..................11
2.2.2 框架效果下的實驗文獻 ............................13
2.3 中小學教師免稅問題相關文獻..........................15
第3章 個人逃漏稅行為之框架分析 ............................19
3.1框架設定 .............................................19
3.2無參考點下之教師逃漏稅模型分析 .......................21
3.2.1 教師逃漏稅之條件 ................................21
3.2.2 所得稅率、罰款倍率和查核率變動對逃漏稅的影響 ....23
3.3在參考點下之教師逃漏稅模型分析---加入扣除額 ..........25
3.3.1參考點之設定 .....................................25
3.3.2教師逃漏稅之條件 .................................26
3.3.3扣繳率等外生變數變動對逃漏稅的影響 ...............28
3.4在參考點下之教師逃漏稅模型分析---加入免稅額 ..........32
3.4.1參考點之設定 .....................................33
3.4.2教師逃漏稅之條件 .................................33
3.4.3扣繳率等外生變數變動對逃漏稅的影響 ...............35
3.5小結 .................................................37
第4章 政府最適行為 ........................................40
4.1最適所得稅率和查核率之制定 ...........................40
4.2比較靜態之數理推導 ...................................41
4.3比較靜態之初步分析 ...................................42
4.3.1扣除額變動對最適所得稅率及查核率的影響 ...........42
4.3.2扣繳率變動對最適所得稅率及查核率的影響 ...........43
4.3.3罰款倍率變動對最適所得稅率及查核率的影響 .........44
4.4模擬分析的模型與參數設定 .............................46
4.5比較靜態之模擬分析結果 ...............................49
第5章結論與建議 ...........................................57
參考文獻 ..................................................61
附錄 ......................................................66
一、中文部分
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