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研究生： 孔設毅
Cyril Couplet
論文名稱： 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討
Probing the Marginal-Debt Corporate Finance Strategy
指導教授： 扈企平
Hu, Joseph
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 商學院 - 國際經營管理英語碩士學位學程(IMBA)
International MBA Program College of Commerce(IMBA)
論文出版年： 2014
畢業學年度： 102
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 52
中文關鍵詞： 邊際債務 、策略
外文關鍵詞： Marginal-Debt, Strategy
相關次數： 點閱：102  下載：37 
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    • 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討

    This thesis aims at understanding the corporate finance strategy of companies which have no or an extremely low debt to equity ratio. For this thesis, companies that have a debt-to-equity ratio less than 5% are defined as “marginal-debt” companies. We identify 167 U.S. public companies which could easily access to the financial market for debt. In order to find some explanations for the phenomenon of marginal-debt, we first examine the trade-off theory. According to the theory, it can be hypothesized that an extremely low corporate tax rate or a high marginal cost of bankruptcy could explain the minimal presence of debt for those marginal-debt companies. However, we find no evidence to accept this hypothesis. Marginal-debt companies have an average tax rate of 31.4%, compared to 29.8% for our sample of indebted companies. They also have a generally better financial health, even when deleveraging their financial ratios. Owing to that, neither bankruptcy cost explains the financial management strategy of marginal-debt. Hence, we expect this phenomenon to be purely behavioral. We therefore propose a survey questionnaire to better analyze the incentives for managers to adopt a marginal-debt strategy..

    Keywords: Marginal-debt, Capital structure, Low leverage, Trade-off theory, Debt aversion

    1. Introduction 1
    2. Survey of Literature 3
    2.1. Capital Structure Theories 3
    2.1.1. The Modigliani Miller Theory 3
    2.1.2. The Trade-Off Theory 6
    2.1.3. The Pecking Order Theory 7
    2.1.4. Summary 8
    2.2. Previous Research on “Marginal Debt” Companies 9
    3. Hypothesis and Methodology 13
    3.1. Definition of Marginal-Debt Companies 14
    3.2. GICS Sectors Distribution of the Sample 14
    3.3. The Parameters 16
    3.3.1. The Tax Rate 18
    3.3.2. The Bankruptcy Cost 18
    3.4. Statistical Method 23
    4. Data and Analysis 25
    4.1. Defining the sample 25
    4.2. Analysis of the Sample Data 29
    4.2.1. Tax Rate 29
    4.2.2. Cost of Bankruptcy 30
    4.3. Findings and Conclusion of the Analysis 36
    5. Suggestions on a Survey Questionnaire 38
    5.1. Relationship between the Manager and Shareholders 38
    5.2. Benefits of Leverage 40
    5.3. Value of Flexibility and Control 41
    5.4. Risk-Averse Inclination 42
    6. Summary and Conclusions 44
    References 45
    Appendix 48

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    http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/27/us-financial-inditex-idUSTRE49Q01R20081027

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