文獻上探討廠商進入市場模型，大都忽略稅制對其造成的影響。有鑑於此，本文應用Bennett and Estrin（2013）的模型，引入利潤公司稅模型來探討廠商進入獨占性競爭市場決策。文中探討利潤稅以及公司稅兩種情況。主要有三點發現：首先，利潤稅制下，稅制的中立性成立。其次，在公司稅制下，稅制的中立性不成立，且先進者與後進者家數較課稅前少。最後，稅率與先進者家數關係不確定，即有可能出現稅率越高，先進者家數越高的情形。

Most of the available literature discussing the models adopted by firms entering markets ignores the influence of tax system. Therefore, this paper applies Bennett and Estrin’s (2013) models and uses profit tax and corporation tax models to discuss strategies for firms entering a monopolistic competition market. This paper explores and discuss two situations, profit tax and corporation tax, and identifies three major points. Firstly, in the profit tax system, tax neutrality is established. Secondly, in the corporation tax system, tax neutrality is not established and the number of first-and of second-movers is lower than before tax. Finally, the relationship between tax rate and the number of first-movers is uncertain. It is possible that a higher tax rate creates a higher number of first-movers.

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