本研究旨在探討經營權換手對企業當期及未來經營績效之影響，並進一步分析不同退場者與入場者類型所造成之績效差異。以2013年至2025年間台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，以總資產報酬率（ROA）及股東權益報酬率（ROE）衡量企業經營績效，探討經營權換手對財務績效之影響。
實證結果顯示，經營權換手與企業當期財務績效呈顯著負相關，表示發生經營權換手之企業，其當期財務績效較差。進一步分析發現，在退場者類型中，以最終控制人換跑道及財務危機退場最具顯著性，其中財務危機退場企業於換手後之績效改善較為明顯；在入場者類型中，則以由財務操作派介入或由內部人承接經營權之企業，其財務績效顯著較差。整體而言，經營權換手與企業財務績效具有顯著關聯，且不同退場者與入場者類型所產生之經濟效果存在差異。研究結果顯示，評估經營權換手對財務績效之影響時，應從退場及入場角度區分換手的類型，以更全面了解其對財務績效之影響。

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