本研究探討non-GAAP盈餘調整與高階經理人薪酬組成之間的關聯，樣本涵蓋2003年至2020年，著重在公司內部獎酬政策選擇以及外部法規改變的影響。實證結果顯示，代表經理人短期績效導向的非權益獎酬和non-GAAP盈餘調整呈現負向關係，而代表長期績效導向的權益基礎獎酬，特別是股票獎酬，則與non-GAAP盈餘調整呈現正向關係。這個結果強化了不同種類薪酬對應到不同財務報導的特性，也顯示出non-GAAP盈餘調整所扮演資訊提供的角色。

本文也檢驗了管制性政策如FAS123R，對於non-GAAP盈餘調整使用的效果，實證顯示FAS123R實行後，使用選擇權獎酬的公司沒有因此使用更多的non-GAAP盈餘調整作為費用的補償，這源自大部分的公司選擇權獎酬的使用大幅減少，而以股票獎酬作為替代；此外，穩健性檢驗顯示有較投機行為的公司，其長短期獎酬工具使用和non-GAAP盈餘調整方向的關係與一般公司一致。因此，從外部法規規範調整，以及內部薪酬政策角度皆顯示non-GAAP盈餘調整是同時存在資訊提供以及投機效果的工具。

This study examines the relationship between non-GAAP earnings adjustments and executive compensation composition from 2003 to 2020, focusing on the impact of internal reward policies and external regulatory changes. The results show that short-term non-equity rewards negatively relate to non-GAAP earnings adjustments, while long-term equity-based rewards, especially stock rewards, have a positive relationship. This suggests different compensation types align with different financial reporting characteristics and underscore non-GAAP earnings adjustments as informative tools.

Additionally, the study finds that after implementing FAS123R, companies did not increase non-GAAP earnings adjustments despite reduced use of option rewards in favor of stock rewards. Robustness tests indicate consistent relationships in companies with speculative behaviors. Overall, non-GAAP earnings adjustments serve as both information and opportunism tools influenced by external regulatory changes and internal compensation policy changes.

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