公司治理的研究,其主要的目的是了解董事會組成,董事會規模,外部董事, 董事及CEO薪酬誘因,CEO改組,外部大股東,外國股東,機構投資人,控制權和股權集中性,併購,法律制度及執行,法源…等變數對以ROA,ROE,會計盈餘,Tobin’s Q和股市報酬率所代表的公司績效之影響。與公司治理有關的重要指標包括股份控制權,現金流量權,董監事席次的控制權,控制權與股權的偏離,次大股東,金字塔結構,交叉持股,優先投票權,外部董事比例等。

本論文共計8章40節,引述國外文獻約500篇並由國際公司治理的實證結果來探討我國五家金控：開發金、台新金、復華金、富邦金、兆豐金的公司治理,最後提出九點結論和建議。

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