本研究探討家族企業進行多角化併購與市場反應績效之關係，以公司治理之變數探討市場對於家族企業進行多角化併購時的反應，著重於代理理論以及管家理論之間的探討，進一步將家族企業的特有性質家族企業創辦人以及家族接班狀況納入研究。本文以台灣經濟新報(TEJ)併購資料庫中2001 年至2017年之多角化併購案件為樣本進行研究。研究發現，樣本中之家族企業在執行多角化併購時市場會反應其對於代理人問題之疑慮，導致當公司偏離程度愈大其市場反應績效愈差。但樣本中之多角化併購案件中並無反應出市場對於家族企業的管家理論行為。另外，家族企業的多角化併購行為當中考量創辦人仍否任職以及家族企業的接班狀況進行分析後，發現創辦人任職與否之無顯著性，但影響方向為正。而市場是否會對二代以上接班人之多角化併購行為給予負面評價，實證結果發現與預期方向一致，為負向關係但並無顯著性。

This study explores the relationship between diversified M&A (diversification) and market response performance (CAR) in Taiwan’s family firms, and explores the reaction of the market to the diversified M&A of family firms based on the variables of corporate governance, focusing on the discussion between agent theory and stewardship theory, and further the unique nature of the family business founders and family succession status are included in the study. The sample of the diversified M&A cases from 2001 to 2017 in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) M&A Database. The study found that the family companies in the sample responded to the agent's problems when performing a diversified M&A, resulting in a worse market performance as the company deviated. However, the diversified M&A cases in the sample did not reflect the market's stewardship theory behavior for family businesses.
In addition, in the diversified M&A activities of the family business, it is considered that the founder still has the position and the succession of the family business. After discovering that the founder has no significant position, the direction of influence is positive. Whether the market will give a negative evaluation of the diversified M&A behavior of the second generation or more successors, the empirical results are consistent with the expected direction.

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