本研究探討不同類型共同基金之機構投資人持股，包括主動型基金、指數型基金與交易型開放式指數基金（ETFs）如何影響企業的 ESG（環境、社會與公司治理）風險曝險與永續表現。研究採用 2015 至 2021 年間美國上市公司之縱橫面資料，結合ESG 事件型風險指標與 S&P Global 的 ESG 評分，並計算機構持股比例。實證方法採用公司與年度固定效果，並對解釋變數做一期間滯後處理，以降低內生性偏誤。結果顯示，主動型基金持股與 ESG 事件發生頻率、嚴重性與新穎性均呈負向關係，但與 ESG 評分呈顯著負相關，可能反映其針對低評分企業進行參與與改善之策略。相對地，指數型基金持股與 ESG 風險事件呈正向關聯，但卻與 ESG 評分正相關，顯示其偏好揭露度高之大型企業。值得注意的是，ETF 持股與 ESG 事件頻率呈顯著負相關，顯示並非所有被動型基金皆對公司治理產生相同效果。研究結果凸顯區分被動基金類型的重要性，並指出 ETF 在結構上可能更能靈活反應 ESG 風險。本研究有助於深化機構投資人異質性在 ESG 影響力上的理解，並對資產治理政策與風險監管實務提供實證參考。

This study investigates how institutional ownership by different types of mutual funds—namely active mutual funds, index mutual funds, and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)—affects firms’ exposure to ESG (environmental, social, and governance) risks and their sustainability performance. Using a panel dataset of U.S. publicly listed firms from 2015 to 2021, I link incident-based ESG risk measures and S&P Global ESG scores with disaggregated institutional ownership data. My empirical strategy employs firm and year fixed effects with lagged independent variables to mitigate endogeneity. The results show that active mutual fund ownership is consistently associated with lower ESG incident frequency, reduced incident severity and novelty, yet paradoxically linked to lower ESG scores—suggesting targeted engagement with underperforming firms. Index fund ownership, by contrast, is linked to higher ESG risk frequency and intensity, but positively associated with ESG scores, likely reflecting a preference for large-cap firms with strong disclosure. Interestingly, ETF ownership is negatively associated with ESG incident frequency, rejecting the hypothesis that all passive funds exert similar governance effects. These findings underscore the importance of distinguishing among passive fund types and suggest that ETF structures may allow for greater responsiveness to ESG risks. Overall, the study contributes to the growing literature on institutional investor heterogeneity and provides timely implications for asset stewardship policies and ESG risk oversight.

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