近年中美科技競爭持續升高，其影響範圍已由晶片、通訊設備與數位平台，逐步延伸至海底電纜等關鍵數位基礎設施。跨太平洋海底電纜作為全球網際網路與跨境資料傳輸的重要骨幹，不僅承載大量國際數據流量，其路徑規劃、登陸節點與控制權配置亦逐漸受到地緣政治與國家安全因素影響。基於此背景，本文以跨太平洋海底電纜為研究對象，探討中美科技競爭背景下跨太平洋海纜路徑變遷、控制權重組與治理模式轉型關聯性，並分析對區域數位空間配置之意涵。
本文採文獻分析法與歷史研究途徑，蒐集2010年至2023年間跨太平洋海底電纜之公開資料、政策文件、產業報告及相關研究成果，從海纜路徑、登陸站分布、投資主體與制度安排等面向進行比較分析，並結合近年重要案例觀察其後續發展趨勢。理論上則透過基礎設施治理、結構權力、相互依存武器化與安全化等觀點，分析海纜如何由商業通訊設施轉變為國家安全與科技競爭的關鍵場域。
跨太平洋海底電纜的路徑變遷不僅反映通訊基礎設施的空間重組，更呈現中美科技競爭向數位基礎設施層次深化的發展趨勢。海纜治理模式的轉型顯示，數位空間已不再完全依循市場邏輯運作，而日益受到安全治理與制度安排所形塑，並可能對印太地區數位秩序與資訊安全環境產生長期影響。

In recent years, U.S.–China technological competition has expanded beyond semiconductors and digital platforms to encompass critical digital infrastructures such as submarine cables. As a key backbone of global Internet connectivity and cross-border data transmission, trans-Pacific submarine cables have become increasingly shaped by geopolitical and national security considerations. This study examines how U.S.–China technological competition has influenced the evolution of trans-Pacific submarine cable routes, control structures, and governance models.
Using document analysis and historical research methods, this study draws upon policy documents, industry reports, academic literature, and publicly available data from 2010 to 2023. It analyzes changes in cable routes, landing stations, investment patterns, and institutional arrangements to explore the growing strategic significance of submarine cables.
The study argues that the evolution of trans-Pacific submarine cable routes reflects not only the spatial reconfiguration of communication infrastructure but also the deepening of U.S.–China technological competition at the digital infrastructure level. The transformation of submarine cable governance further suggests that digital space is increasingly shaped by security considerations and institutional arrangements, with implications for the future digital order in the Indo-Pacific.

一、 中文部份
（一） 專書
易君博，2003年。《政治理論與研究方法》。臺北：三民書局。
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（二） 專書論文
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（三） 期刊論文
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（四） 學位論文
王伊文，2024年。《海底電纜的安全化理論研究：以臺琉海纜與臺馬海纜為例》。臺北：國立臺灣大學政治學系碩士論文。
（五） 官方文件
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（六） 網際網路
方鈺麟、陳詩沁，2024/10/3。〈海底電纜：數字經濟的絲綢之路〉，《港大經管學院》，<https://www.hkubs.hku.hk/tc/research/thought-leadership/opinions-and-speeches/submarine-cables-the-silk-road-of-the-digital-economy/>。
江炘杓，2025/1/10。〈我國海底電纜頻遭破壞之分析與建議〉，《即時評析》，財團法人國防安全研究院。<https://indsr.org.tw/focus?pid=2762&uid=11>。
自由財經，2021/12/18。〈海底電纜連結台灣和菲律賓　美支持Google、Meta使用〉，《自由財經》。<https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/3772721>。
李家樑，2020/4/10。〈美國准Google用連接台灣海底電纜　香港被踢出局因為華為？〉，《香港01》。<https://www.hk01.com/數碼生活/459071/美國准google用連接台灣海底電纜-香港被踢出局因為華為>。
邱巧貞，2026/3/19。〈海纜納入「國家關鍵基礎設施」！首份調查報告預計5月公布〉，《自由財經》。<https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/5376318>。
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區慶威，2019/8/30。〈美國隨時禁用Google、Facebook連接香港加州海底光纖電纜〉，《香港01》。<https://www.hk01.com/數碼生活/369544/美國隨時禁用-google-facebook-連接香港加州海底光纖電纜>。
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黃浩珉，2025/2/12。〈海底電纜斷裂危機下，台灣維繫「數位生命線」的應變挑戰〉，《報導者》。<https://www.twreporter.org/a/damaged-undersea-cables-raises-alarm-in-taiwan>。
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二、 英文部分
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（二） 專書論文
Burnett, Douglas R., 2019. “Strategic Importance of, and Dependence on, Undersea Cables,” in CCDCOE, ed., Undersea Cables: The Hidden Battleground, Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE, pp. 11-28.
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（四） 官方文件
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（五） 網際網路
Globe Telecom, 2017/8/11. “Globe Commercially Launches SEA-US Cable System,” Globe Telecom, <https://www.globe.com.ph/about-us/newsroom/business/sea-us-cable-system-connects-davao-to-us>.
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Google Cloud, 2022/4/6. “Topaz Subsea Cable Connects Canada and Asia,” Google Cloud Blog, <https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/topaz-subsea-cable-connects-canada-and-asia>.
Gross, Anna, Heal, Alexandra, Campbell, Chris, Clark, Dan, Bott, Ian and de la Torre Arenas, Irene, 2023/6/12. “How the US Is Pushing China Out of the Internet’s Plumbing,” Financial Times, <https://ig.ft.com/subsea-cables/>.
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