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| 研究生： |
黃裕舜 |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
相互性對公共財實驗中合作行為的影響 |
| 指導教授： | 徐麗振 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
社會科學學院 - 財政學系 Department of Public Finance |
| 論文出版年： | 2003 |
| 畢業學年度： | 91 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 46 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 相互性 、公共財實驗 |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：103 下載：110 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
在公共財實驗中，受試者決策行為存在著「相互性」的考量是用來解釋受試者出現合作行為的原因之一。本篇研究以三人一組的實驗驗證受試者確有相互性之考量。受試者欲以較高的貢獻去「回報」同組成員的高貢獻，而受試者亦欲以較低的貢獻去「報復」同組成員的低貢獻。此外，當受試者同時面對的組員有著兩種截然不同的貢獻態度時，受試者的「相互性」卻並非是正負中和而完全抵銷，受試者行為會受兩股相反方向力量的影響而顯得變動較為劇烈，且受試者傾向有較深的報復情緒，這樣的情緒會凌駕互助的情緒而影響受試者的決策。
目次
1. 前言
2. 文獻回顧
2.1 早期學者關於公共財的實驗結果
2.2 實驗結果趨向理論解的解釋
2.3 實驗結果偏離理論解的解釋
2.4 關於相互性的文獻回顧
3. 研究動機與目的
4. 實驗設計與執行過程
5. 實驗結果
5.1 學習效果
5.2 終期效果
5.3 restart效果
6. 關於受試者相互性行為的觀察
6.1 簡述受試者行為的基本觀察
6.2 分類受試者行為符合相互性之預期
6.3 受試者投資決策之方向符合相互性預期
7. 結論與未來可研究方向
附錄：實驗步驟說明
參考文獻
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