近年來，環境、社會與公司治理（Environmental, Social and Governance, ESG）資訊已成為衡量企業永續治理的重要依據，但較高的永續揭露程度是否反映於員工資源投入與人力配置結果，仍有待實證檢驗。
本研究以2015年至2024年間臺灣14家金融控股公司母公司為研究對象，採用臺灣經濟新報TESG指標衡量永續揭露程度，並以員工平均薪資、平均非薪資福利及員工變動率作為實質員工福利制度之代理變數。主要解釋變數為前一期TESG綜合分數及E、S、G構面分數，主要迴歸樣本共112筆公司年度觀察值。主要分析採Pooled OLS，並檢驗所有權結構調節效果及CPI敏感性分析，另以固定效果與隨機效果模型進行補充穩健性分析。
結果顯示，Pooled OLS中前一期環境構面分數與員工平均薪資及平均非薪資福利呈顯著正向關聯，其餘永續揭露變數未呈現一致的直接關聯；各項永續揭露分數與員工變動率均未達顯著。所有權結構調節結果顯示，TESG、社會及公司治理構面與公股虛擬變數之交乘項，在薪資及非薪資福利模型中呈顯著正向。CPI調整後主要判斷未實質改變；惟FE與RE補充分析顯示，環境構面在薪資及非薪資福利模型中的顯著性不再成立，表示相關結果對模型設定較為敏感。
綜合而言，較高的永續揭露程度並不必然伴隨較高的員工資源投入或員工人數淨增加，其關聯會因永續構面、所有權結構及模型設定而有所不同。本研究結果應解釋為統計關聯，不作嚴格因果推論。

This study examines the relationship between ESG disclosure and employee resource allocation in 14 Taiwanese financial holding companies from 2015 to 2024. ESG disclosure is measured using one-year-lagged TESG composite and environmental, social, and governance scores. Employee outcomes are measured by average salary, average non-salary benefits, and employee headcount change. The main regression sample consists of 112 firm-year observations. Pooled OLS is used as the primary estimation method to examine direct effects and ownership moderation, supplemented by inflation-adjusted analyses and fixed-effects and random-effects models.
The Pooled OLS results show that the lagged environmental score is positively associated with average salary and non-salary benefits, whereas the other ESG measures show no consistent direct associations. None of the ESG measures is significantly associated with employee headcount change. For ownership moderation, the interactions of state ownership with the lagged TESG, social, and governance scores are significantly positive in the salary and non-salary benefit models, while the environmental interaction is insignificant. Inflation adjustment does not materially change the main findings. However, the environmental effects on salary and non-salary benefits become insignificant under the fixed-effects and random-effects specifications, indicating sensitivity to model specification.
Overall, higher ESG disclosure is not necessarily associated with greater employee resource investment or net employee growth. The relationships vary across ESG dimensions, ownership structures, and model specifications. The findings should therefore be interpreted as statistical associations rather than causal effects.

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