跳到主要內容

簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 林士揚
Lin, Shih-Yang
論文名稱: 學術期刊禁止一稿多投之經濟分析
An economic analysis of the prohibition against multiple submission
指導教授: 周德宇
林忠正
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 社會科學學院 - 財政學系
Department of Public Finance
論文出版年: 2009
畢業學年度: 97
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 55
中文關鍵詞: 學術期刊一稿多投審稿延遲
外文關鍵詞: academic journal, multiple submission, refereeing delay
相關次數: 點閱:252下載:100
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報
  • 本研究主旨在於探討學術期刊普遍禁止一稿多投的現象與其成因。文章中將使用考慮出版者以及學術投稿者的兩階段模型來刻劃投稿、審查,以及投稿規則決策的過程。

    初步模型將呈現當投稿者無明顯時間偏好以及各期刊審稿延遲時間一致時,一稿一投或是一稿多投規則對於整體學術產業而言並無差異。其後本文第四章將導入差異審稿延遲所帶來的影響並得出擁有較高聲望的期刊為避免在一稿多投制度下次級期刊利用較快的審查速度奪取較高品質的文章因而將不願意開放一稿多投的結論。

    本研究後部分章節將分析各投稿規則對於整體產業福利水準之影響並得到以下結論。一稿一投制度不見得會為整體產業帶來福利增進,但由於投稿者與出版者之間利益不一致性的存在終將難以使得一稿多投成為最後的均衡投稿規則。


    This paper attempts to explore “why the journals in most academic fields like economics refuse to accept Multiple-submission (or simultaneous submission).” In this study, we use a two-stage model involving publishers and academic authors to illustrate the process of submitting, reviewing, and the submission policy determining.

    The first model shows an indifference result for the whole academic industry to adopt a Sole-submission or a Multiple-submission rule when authors’ utility is time-irrelevant and the reviewing delays of both journals are identical. We latter introduce the effect of differentiated refereeing delay of journals on the authors’ submission behavior in chapter 4 and show that a journal with higher prestige will refuse to adopt multiple submission rule to avoid the possibility that a faster reviewing process may give the less prestigious journal ability to “steal” high quality papers from the more prestigious one under multiple-submission.

    The welfare is further studied in the later sections. We calculate the overall welfare of the industry and find that even thought the current sole-submission system is not necessarily welfare superior than multiple-submission, it seems that the rigidity of the submission rule is hard to be removed due to the conflicting interests between authors and publishers.

    1. Introduction
    1.1 Research background 1
    1.2 Relative literature 2

    2. The basic model
    2.1 Assumptions 4
    2.1.1 The utility of author
    2.1.2 The utility of publishers
    2.2 The equilibrium without time-preference and refereeing delay difference 6
    2.2.1 The decisions of authors
    2.2.2 The decisions of journals
    2.3 Welfare analysis 11

    3. Time preference submission model
    3.1 The equilibrium with time preference 14
    3.1.1 The decisions of authors
    3.1.2 The decisions of journals
    3.2 Welfare analysis 23

    4. Asymmetric reply submission model
    4.1 Specific assumptions 28
    4.2 Equilibrium with Asymmetric reply time 30
    4.2.1 The decisions of authors
    4.2.2 The decisions of journals
    4.2.3 Welfare Analysis 41

    5. Conclusion and further extensions
    5.1 Conclusion 46
    5.2 Further extensions 47

    Reference

    Appendix

    Azar, Ofer H. (2006), “The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make It More Efficient?” American Economist, 50(1), 37-50

    Coe, R. K., and I. Weinstock (1967), “Editorial Policies of Major Economic Journals,” Southern Economic Journal, 7(4), 37-43

    Coupé, Tom (2004), “What do we Know about Ourselves? On the Economics of Economics,” Kyklos, 57, No. 2, 197-215

    Ferber, Marianne A. and Michelle Teiman (1980), “Are Women Economists at a Disadvantage in Publishing Journal Articles?” Eastern Economics Journal, 6 , 189-193

    Gordon, R. A. (1980), “The Advantage of a Simple System of Optional Published Refereeing,” Speculations in Science and Technology, 3, 607-609

    Ng, Yew-Kwang (1991), “Polish and Publish: The Economics of Simultaneous Submission,” Seminar Paper, Department of Economics, Monash University

    Peters, Douglas P. and Stephen J. Ceci (1982), “Peer-Review Practices of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again,” The Behavioral and Brain Science, 5(2), 187-195

    Pressman, Steven (1994), “Simultaneous Multiple Journal Submission: The Case Against,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53(3), 316-333

    Szenberg, Michael (1994), “Dissemination Scholarly Output: The Case for Elimination the Exclusivity of Journal Submission,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53, 303-315

    Yohe, Gary W. (1980), “Current Publication Lags in Economics Journals,” Journal of Economics Literature, 18, 1050-1055

    Ziman, John. (1968), Public Knowledge: The Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge IIP.

    QR CODE
    :::