歐盟的規範性權力對人權的普遍化越來越重要。不少國家包含中國批評過歐盟的人權外交。同時許多學者把歐盟成為一個規範的權力。有些學者會批評歐盟的規範性權力，他們認為歐盟的規範性權力是無效的。但是，很少有人研究各個成員國的規範性權力的對外宣傳。本論文面對這個題目與確保歐盟的分裂是否與規範性權力有影響力。

The European Union (EU) has become an international player in the promotion of values and ideas to other nations. It has been criticized by China for its human rights diplomacy, yet it has been commended for setting standards among many nations. Scholars have called the EU a normative power, saying value promotion has become the cornerstone of EU foreign policy, but also argued about the effectiveness of the EU’s normative foreign policy. However, little has been said about what states are doing on the individual level to promote or to avoid promoting, EU norms with non-member states. A unilateral approach to normative power promotion avoids the trap of assumptions associated with the argument of the effectiveness of normative power, with concrete examples and empirical data. This thesis has been organized to build an argument that the choices that EU member states make to either promote, or not promote, EU norms, are related to member states’ relationships with China, by finding what states are doing to promote, or to avoid promoting, EU norms on a state level. As it is accepted that China’s economic power is its commonly used tool, this thesis uses Chinese investment as an independent variable to observe how the actions states take can change due to their relationship with China. By analyzing the causal chain of Chinese investment and close political relations, it discusses how Chinese investment is clearly linked to close political relations with China. Therefore, Chinese investment leads to close political relations and in turn influences member states’ stances on issues related to China, which can lead to fragmentation between EU member states. While many assume fragmentation influences the EU’s ability to promote normative values through its member states, this thesis proves that states can, and do, promote EU normative foreign policy unilaterally, while disproving the argument that fragmentation prevents the EU from promoting normative foreign policy. Chinese investment can, and does, influence EU normative power promotion, but it influences it on the state level. Some states are actively promoting EU normative foreign policy, while others are actively ignoring it. Through a comparative case study to examine Germany and Hungary, this thesis views how member states interact with China, observes how Chinese investment is occurring in the member states, and explores how member states act in relation to China and the promotion of normative values.

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