簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示
| 研究生： |
蕭瀚屏 Hsiao, Han Ping |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱： |
財政政策與主權債務危機 The sovereign risk and the fiscal policy |
| 指導教授： |
黃俞寧
無 |
| 學位類別： |
碩士
Master |
| 系所名稱： |
社會科學學院 - 經濟學系 Department of Economics |
| 論文出版年： | 2011 |
| 畢業學年度： | 99 |
| 語文別： | 中文 |
| 論文頁數： | 29 |
| 中文關鍵詞： | 動態隨機一般均衡模型 、財政政策 、主權債務危機 |
| 外文關鍵詞： | DSGE model, fiscal policy, sovereign risk |
| 相關次數： | 點閱：409 下載：97 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
在次級房貸風暴之後，各國赤字大幅增加。如希臘與愛爾蘭，其主權債務違約風險皆大幅升高。面對這樣的困境，政府該如何實施財政政策，以防止主權債務危機的發生?本篇文章在DSGE模型之下，以Uribe(2006)的設定為基礎架構，額外增加了產出方程式以使國家產出能由模型內生決定。並加入了政府支出與產出之間的關係式，以討論在面對正的景氣衝擊與負的景氣衝擊時，政府使用正向景氣循環政策和負向景氣循環政策對於政府倒債率的影響。最後發現當政府使用負向景氣循環政策和較弱的順向景氣循環政策時，政府的倒債率會和技術衝擊有反向的關係。而當政府使用較強的順向景氣循環政策時，政府的倒債率會和技術衝擊有正向的關係。從此結果，我們推論在後金融海嘯時期，希臘與愛爾蘭等國家，應使用較強的順景氣循環政策以降低其主權債務危機的發生機率。
After the subprime crisis, many government deficits rose sharply, especially Greece and Ireland. Their default rate rose greatly than before. Under this difficult situation, what kind of fiscal policy should the government enforces to prevent it from bankruptcy? We follow the model in Uribe (2006) as our framework but adding the production function and the government expenditure function to analyze the effects of different fiscal policies on the government default rate. The results tell us that when the government uses countercyclical fiscal policy and weak procyclical fiscal policy, the change of the default rate is opposite to the technical shock. On the contrary, when the government uses strong procyclical fiscal policy, the default rate is positive relation with the technical shock. This implies that governments, such as Greece and Ireland, should use strong procyclical fiscal policy to reduce their sovereign risk under the recession.
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1
1.1 Motivation………………………………………………………………………1
1.2 Literature review………………………………………………………………..2
2. The model…………………………………………………………………………...7
2.1 Household……………………………………………………………………….7
2.2 The fiscal authority………………………………………..……………………9
2.3 Equilibrium………………………………………………………………...….10
3. Discussion……..........….…………………………..………………………...……14
3.1 The countercyclical and procyclical fiscal policy…………………………..…14
3.1.1 The relationship between and ………………………………...…....14
3.1.2 The relationship between and …………….…………………...…15
3.2 Other factors and the policy implication………………………...………….....16
4. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………....19
Reference……………………………………………………………………………..20
Appendix ………………………..………………………………………...………….21
1. Bi, Huixin. 2010. “Sovereign default Risk Premia, Fiscal Limits, and Fiscal Policy,” working paper.
2. Caballero, Ricardo J. and Krishnamurthy, Avrind. 2004. “Fiscal Policy and Financial Depth,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper 10532.
3. Devereux, M. B., 2010. “Fiscal Deficits, Debt, and Monetary Policy in A Liquidity Trap,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institution Working Paper No.44
4. Furceri, Davide and Mourougane, Annabelle. 2010. “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Output and Debt Sustainability in the Euro Area: A DSGE Analysis,” OECD working paper
5. Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth. 2009. “This Time Is Different,” Princeton University Press.
6. Romer, David. 2006. “Advanced Macroeconomics, Third Edition,” The McGraw-Hill Companies. Section 11.10.
7. Uribe, Martin. 2006. “A Fiscal theorem of Sovereign Risk,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, pp. 1857-1875.
