對局理論的發展中，以往都著重於合作對局的探討與應用，且有相當的成

就與理論根據，但實際的現實生活中，合作對局並無法與之配合。譬如商

業上，經濟上的競爭，乃至於政治上，參與對局的任何一方，皆不願意把

其資訊，商情，完全的公開，此時，參與者彼此之間的資訊及對整個對局

的了解所產生的信念就對對局均衡解有極重大的影響。最初的對局乃假設

對局的結構(如償付、參與者）是完全資訊。爾後 Harsanyi將其引入自

然(nature)此一參與者及型式(type)和信念(belief)使得償付無法成為彼

此的共識(common knowledge)，但在不完全資訊下的對局仍可使用完全資

訊對局的方法概念，幫助我們如何求得不完全資訊對局之均衡解。因此本

文乃將先回顧完全資訊下的對局求解方法，然後探討如何引入資訊概念，

並求得不完全資訊對局之均衡解以及如何精簡(refi- nement)其解，和其

解是否存在。而不完全資訊對局先介紹型式、信念及均衡解的概念，並特

別對共識、近似共識(almost common knowledge)加以探討。本文分為七

章，第一章為前言，第二章為古典對局其主要分為正規型式對局(normal-

form games)及擴展型式對局(extensive-form games)，及回顧Nash均衡

解之定義，並討論數種均衡解之求法，並証明混合策略 Nash均衡存在定

理，其主要參考資料為參考文獻[10][12][23]。第三章為不完全資訊下的

靜態對局，其主要乃說明貝氏均衡的概念並以此詮釋完全資訊下混合策略

Nash均衡的涵義。第四章為不完全資訊下的動態對局，其著重於敘述完全

貝氏均衡(Perfect Baysian Equilibrium)，及一般對局精簡之概念即逐

次均衡(Sequential Equilibrium)、完全均衡(Perfect Equilibrium

or Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium)和Proper Equilibrium。第

五章討論第四章的重要特例即不完全資訊下的動態對局─訊息對局，並應

用到1973年Spence工會─廠商訊息對局(Job-market signaling game)。

第六章討論共識的意義及性質，並應用在電子郵件系統，其主要參考資料

為參考文獻為[3],[24]。第七章介紹一種近似共識及及共有$p-$信念(

common $p-$belief)的概念可幫助我們解決第六章遭遇的問題，其主要參

考資料為參考文獻[20]。最後第八章乃結論。

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