我國幾年來，由於產業民主運動開始萌芽起步，社會各界對於應否引進員工參與經營制度之討論，甚囂塵上。其中最引人注目者，首推立法院於民國八十五年一月在審查「電信三法」時，電信工會主張董事會應有一定比例之員工董事席次，而掀起我國宜否採行員工參與經營制度及應否優先適用於國營事業之論爭，亦使其夾雜濃郁之政治氣息。惟最後經期野立法委員協商之結果，並未付諸立法，而僅於中華電信股份有限公司條例第五條第一項規定：「本公司置董事十一人至十五人，組織董事會；另置監察人三人至五人。董事會應有五分之一專家代表。」同時附帶決議專家中應包括有員工代表。此外，立法院於民國八十六年十二月十八日在審查「國營事業管理法第三十五條修正案」時，再度引發我國宜否採行員工參與經營制度及應否優先適用於國營事業之爭議，同時一讀通過國營事業管理法第三十五條之修正條文為：「國營事業董事監察人，不得兼任其他國營事業董事監察人。前項董事監察人應至少有三分之一之席次，由工會推派員工代表擔任。」

惟問題在於，觀諸德國、歐洲聯盟及大陸採行員工參與經營制度之立法經驗，除各有其特殊之立法背景及目的外，且在公司經營機關之制度設計上，亦與我國所人差異，因此就我國公司經營機關之改造問題而言，在立法政策上宜否朝引進員工參與經營制度來發展，誠有疑問。相對地，反觀美國及日本之立法經驗，除其公司經營機關之制度設計有其特色外，尚分別實施所謂之外部董事制度及外部監察人制度，而不採行員工參與經營制度，從而對我國公司經營機關之改造問題而論，亦值得重視。

管見以為，如要釐清我國應否或宜否採行員工參與經營制度，首先應從分析各國公司經營機關之制度設計，正確理解相互間之差異著手，並從向來傳統企業法之理論發展及批判中，找尋或建構其具有說服力之理論基礎。其次，由於員工參與經營制度對我國現行之公司法制來說，其內容不僅較為陌生，亦是對我國公司經營機關結構之重大變革，影響深遠，因此實有選擇具有代表性之外國法制，加以從事比較法研究之必要，以期正確掌握其全貌。再者，由於法學研究終應面對社會，並就社會問題提出針貶之道，因此尚應進一步整理分析我國各界目前所提出之各種論點，以正確選擇及評價我國公司法制之改造方向，進而說明為達成改造公司經營機關之目的，所可能採行之各種政策方向及法律策略。

有鑑於此，本文第一章主要在於闡明選定本題目研究之動機，並說明本文之研究目的、方法及範圍，希望能透過比較法之研究及評價，評估我國有無採行員工參與經營制度之必要性及可行性，進而指出我國公司經營機關改造之基本方向。

第二章除說明員工參與經營之意義，整理傳統企業法理論在德國、美國及日本之發展外，尚嘗試從大規模公司具有社會結合體特質之觀點，導出員工參與經營制度之法理基礎。此外，由於員工參與經營制度之採行，涉及對股東所有權之限制問題，因此其在憲法上應如何評價或其合憲性基礎何在，本章亦一併加以探討。

第三章至第七章乃是各國法制之比較法研究。其中第三章至第五章，則分別介紹及分析德國、歐洲聯盟及大陸在員工參與經營制度方面之立法及構想，期能透過比較法之觀察，掌握其之立法背景及制度特點，作為我國立法及政策決定之參考。至於第六章及第七章，除分別探討美國及日本何以不採行員工參與經營制度之主要原因外，並對其晚近在公司經營機關之改造問題上，之所以朝外部董事制度或外部監察人制度發展之原因及實施現況，期能有助於立法政策之正確選擇。

第八章乃從我國公司經營機關之實情及缺失出發，並針對我國各界就公司經營機關改造問題所提出之三種主要論爭，詳加辨正，並分析引進各種制度所應採取之法律策略。

第九章除從大規模公司具有社會結合體特質之角度，提出加強大規模公司內部監控之法理基礎外，並就各國法制加以適度評價，期能從中找出最適合我國採行之法制。此外，綜觀各國法制之評價及分析後，本文更具體建議，如從強化大規模公司內部監控之觀點，我國今後應採行外部監察人制度，最為適當。

Following the progress of "the Industrial Democratic Movement" recently years in Taiwan, R.O.C., the introduction of the concept of the "Workers' Participation in Management Organs" in corporate operation has been discussed in depth. In Jan. 1996, when the so-called "Three Regulations Regarding Telecommunication Industry" (regulations regarding the privatization of the state-owned telecommunication company and the future structure of the telecommunication industry) were brought into the Legislative Yuan (the Congress), the Union strongly demand the introduction of the "employee director" system, and therefore heat up the discussions on this issue and its leading application on the state-owned companies.

On a comparative basis, the legislation in German, and European Union, even in Mainland China which adopted the system of the "Workers' Participation in Management Organs" has its own historical background and specific goals which deserve our special attentions while re-designing of remodeling the company management organs in the Company Law. On the other hand, the legislation in the United States and Japan, in stead of the system of the "Workers' Participation in Management Organs", adopted the "Outside Director" and "Outside Auditor" system with different thoughts. All these and more contribute to the intrinsic and multi-dimensional discussions on the re-structuring of the company management organs in the Company Law of Taiwan, the Republic of China.

Chapter One gives the scope and approaches of the study, and by employing comparative-law-study perspective, assesses the necessity and probability of adopting the concept of the "Workers' Participation in Management Organs" in our Company Law.

Chapter Two reviews the histories and evolution on the traditional corporate law theory in Germany, the United States and Japan, and from the character of "the social integrated body" of big companies, constructs the juristic basis for adopting the concept in our Company Law. Because this involves the issue of restraining the shareholders' rights, the constitutionality of the adopting the concept is also discussed in details.

From Chapter Three to Chapter Seven are the comparative studies on various legal systems. Chapter Three to Five discuss the systems in Germany, European Union and Mainland China, provide the fundamental analysis of the concept and characters of the "Workers' Participation in Management Organs". Chapter Six to Seven explore the reasons why the United States and Japan chose the "Outside Director" and "Outside Auditor" system instead, and its current application and situation. Hopefully the discussions will help the future legislation.

Chapter Eight details the reality underlying the corporate operation in Taiwan, and analyzes the argument on three major issues regarding the proposed evolution of the management organs in Taiwan, and accordingly provides related legal strategies.

Chapter Nine provides the legal basis for re-enforcing the internal control in big companies due to the big companies' possession of the character of "the social integrated body", and further concludes it might be most appropriate to adopt to adopt the "Outside Auditor" system in Taiwan.