經濟快速發展帶來的環境衝擊，近年來逐漸成為全球關注的焦點，為了達成環境與經濟永續發展的目標，各國政府如何透過政策的實行，提高有關污染減量的研發誘因以調整產業結構亦為重要的課題，大部分的文獻著重於策略性環境政策與貿易之間的關係，並進一步分析福利的變化，本文主要係從產業組織的觀點出發，將產業研發決策與環境政策作連結，探討環境政策與污染減量之研發投入間的關係，並進一步分析研發投入在兩國合作與非合作之環境政策的影響。
透過兩國三地模型的應用並輔以二階段賽局之分析方法，本文發現環境政策對污染減量之研發投入水準的影響，取決於消費者對產品的需求與研發的外溢效果大小而定，至於兩國在環境政策上，在廠商之研發投入為外生變數的前提下，各別訂定的污染稅隨著廠商研發的投入而調降，而共同訂定的污染稅反而隨著研發的投入而提高。

There has been a growing concern about the impact of economic development on the global environment which has deeply influenced by the uncontrolled pollution emissions. In order to reduce pollution emissions, governments have incentives to use environmental policies to encourage the private R&D spending which targets on reducing pollutions. Therefore, in this paper we develop a three-country model to examine the relationship between environmental policy and the level of the private R&D. And we also investigate the effects of the private R&D investments in the environmental agreements between countries. A principal finding is that when governments levy tax on pollution emissions, it turns out that firms may or may not increase its level of the R&D spending. In addition, in setting the R&D spending as the exogenous variable, ceteris paribus, the non-cooperative emission-tax will decrease when the R&D spending increases. However, on the contrary, the increased R&D spending will lead to the increasing of the cooperative emission-tax.

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