本研究探討美國股票型主動型 ETF 經理人在中期績效落後，是否會提高同年度後續期間之風險。本文以主動型 ETF 年初之累積報酬衡量中期績效，並以中期評估後與評估前之報酬波動度比率衡量風險調整行為。實證結果顯示，競賽誘因存在於主動型 ETF 市場，中期績效較差的主動型 ETF 後續風險調整比率較高，且此現象主要集中於 4 月至6 月，進入下半年後則明顯減弱。進一步分析發現，COVID-19 期間此關係在高度市場不確定性下變得較不明顯；新主動型ETF 與小型主動型 ETF 在落後時則更傾向提高風險，不同投資策略類別亦呈現異質性。整體而言，主動型 ETF 所承擔之風險會受到經理人之相對績效壓力、市場環境與基金特性所影響。

This study examines whether managers of U.S. equity-based active ETFs increase risk in the subsequent period of the same year after experiencing weak interim performance. Interim performance is measured by the cumulative return from the beginning of the year, while risk adjustment behavior is measured by the ratio of return volatility after the interim evaluation period to return volatility before the evaluation period. The empirical results show that tournament incentives exist in the active ETF market. Active ETFs with weaker interim performance tend to exhibit higher subsequent risk adjustment ratios, and this pattern is mainly concentrated from April to June, becoming less evident in the second half of the year. Further analysis shows that this relationship becomes less pronounced during the COVID-19 period under heightened market uncertainty. New active ETFs and small active ETFs are more likely to increase risk after underperformance, and risk adjustment behavior also varies across investment strategy categories. Overall, the risk-taking behavior of active ETF managers is influenced by relative performance pressure, market conditions, and fund characteristics.

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